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I. INTRODUCTION
Justice Stephen Breyer recently caused a minor stir when he used
the pronoun "I" in a Supreme Court majority opinion.2 After sur-
prised Court observers called the usage to Breyer's attention, he dis-
closed that it was "inadvertent" and would be corrected. 3 Why should
the choice of pronoun generate even a minor stir and prompt a judicial
retreat? Breyer had departed from a long-standing convention that
dictates that a Justice writing for the Court may speak in the first
person plural - "we" - but not in the first person singular. Even
though a single Justice signs the opinion by name, the text insists
throughout on its shared provenance as the voice not just of its author
but of all those who have voted to join it.
This traditional balance of the institutional and the personal has
shifted in this century from the Court's earlier insistence on present-
ing what Learned Hand termed "monolithic solidarity" to the world.4
That insistence began with Chief Justice Marshall's determination
that the Court should no longer resolve its cases seriatim, with each
Justice writing separately, but instead in a single, unified opinion.5
The resulting culture of the Court, one that discouraged both dissent-
ing and concurring opinions as assaults on this unified front, persisted
from Marshall's day into the 1930s. 6 The Court in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries thus deliberately submerged the idea of a
personal voice in the fiction of a collective voice, one that spoke for the
institution rather than for the Justice who served as its designated
scribe.
The monolith began to splinter in the early decades of the twenti-
eth century and today is barely recognizable. With the dramatic up-
2. Tony Mauro, Breyer's "I" Scream, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 26, 1999, at 1.
3. Id. at 7.
4. LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 72 (1958). According to Hand, "disunity
cancels the impact of monolithic solidarity on which the authority of a bench of
judges so largely depends." Id.
5. See Karl M. ZoBell, Division of Opinion in the Supreme Court: A History of Judi-
cial Disintegration, 44 CORNELL L.Q. 186, 192-93 (1959).
6. The Court first produced more than twenty-five dissenting opinions in the 1937
Term; five years later, in the 1942 Term, the number had climbed to sixty-three.
See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & Roy M. MERSKY, THE FIRST ONE HUNDRED JUSTICES
137-40 (1978).
The number of concurring opinions, generally considerably smaller than the
number of dissents, did not exceed twenty-five until the 1944 Term. See id. For
an account of the arguments opposing and supporting dissenting opinions in the
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, see Laura Krugman Ray, Justice Bren-
nan and the Jurisprudence of Dissent, 61 TEmp. L. REV. 307, 308-10 (1988) [here-
inafter Ray, Jurisprudence of Dissent]. Very little has been written about the
concurrence. For a brief summary of the existing literature, see Laura Krugman
Ray, The Justices Write Separately: Uses of the Concurrence by the Rehnquist
Court, 23 U.C. DAviS L. REV. 777, 780-83 (1990) [hereinafter Ray, Write
Separately].
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surge in the number of separate opinions, both dissents and
concurrences, written by the Justices since the late 1930s,7 there has
been no lack of opinions speaking directly, sometimes even emotion-
ally, about their authors' individual positions. As the reaction to Jus-
tice Breyer's misstep indicates, however, those inside and outside the
Court still value the ideal of a majority opinion that avoids any overt
signs that it reflects the personal views of its individual author, even
while Court scholars continue to assess the Justices' jurisprudence
based largely on their signed opinions. The consequence for the Court
of this tension between institutional and individual authorship is a
more complicated and more finely calibrated jurisprudence, one in
which Justices dutifully refrain from using "I" in their own majority
opinions but feel free to pick and choose among the parts of a col-
league's opinion, joining only those which they wholeheartedly en-
dorse and writing separately to detail their points of divergence.
This shifting balance between the impersonal and the individual is
evident as well in the history of what was traditionally the most im-
personal variety of opinion, the per curiam, which suppressed not only
the identify of its author but the idea of attributed authorship itself.
In its earliest appearances, the per curiam was true to its name, au-
thored anonymously and presented "by the Court" rather than by a
designated Justice to express a result that enjoyed full institutional
support.8 The subtext of a per curiam was clear: this case is so easily
resolvable, so lacking in complexity or disagreement among the Jus-
7. See C. HERmAN PRITCHETr, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL PoLITIcs
AND VALUEs 1937-1947, at 24 (1948). According to Pritchett's figures, in the 1935
Term only 16 percent of the Court's opinions were non-unanimous; by the 1938
Term the figure was 34 percent, and by 1943 it had climbed to 58 percent. See id.
at 25.
8. See BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1156 (7th ed. 1999). Very little has been written
about the per curiam. The most valuable piece is Stephen L. Wasby et al., The
Per Curiam Opinion: Its Nature and Functions, 76 JUDICATURE 29, 32 (1992),
which focuses on the Court's use of the per curiam from the 1969 to the 1981
Terms and provides interesting statistics. For the argument that the issuance by
appellate courts of brief, non-explanatory per curiams is abusive and "not com-
patible with a democratic system of government," see Tobias Weiss, What Price
Per Curiam?, 39 TmAL LAw. GUIDE 23, 30 (1995). For the counterargument, that
signed opinions from intermediate appellate courts should be barred as "an un-
fortunate blending of judicial ego into the institutional mixture," see Richard
Lowell Nygaard, The Maligned Per Curiam: A Fresh Look at an Old Colleague, 5
SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 41 (1994-95). For an ironic essay which argues
that "Judge Per Curiam... has been drafted for too many hard cases," see Henry
S. Manley, Nonpareil Among Judges, 34 CORNELL L.Q. 51, 51-52 (1948). One
handbook for judges lists five reasons for writing a per curiam, including the oc-
casion when the panel assigned a case "feels that the issue raised is one demand-
ing that the court speak with a single voice." JOYCE J. GEORGE, JUDICIAL OPINION
WRrrING HANDBOOK 220 (3d ed. 1993). Another handbook author finds the per
curiam "both proper and desirable" for limited situations, including those when
"the difficulty of reaching agreement on a particular draft opinion... may make
2000]
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tices, that it requires only a brief, forthright opinion that any member
of the Court could draft and that no member of the Court need sign.
The per curiam was not, however, insulated from the shift in the
Court's opinion-writing process from impersonality to individual ex-
pression. Rather, the per curiam has functioned as a microcosm of
that shift, reflecting in its evolution the increasing tendency of the
Justices to assert their personal views even in the most impersonal
context.
Thus, in the late 1930s, as concurrences and dissents proliferated,
the role of the per curiam also changed. Per curiam opinions increas-
ingly came with dissents attached, creating an oxymoronic form, one
that simultaneously insisted on both institutional consensus and indi-
vidual disagreement. In the 1950s and 1960s the Court also found
that the impersonal nature of the per curiam made it the ideal instru-
ment for a variety of strategic purposes, from the efficient resolution
of urgent cases to the evasion of controversial issues and the making
of new law by indirection. By the 1970s the Court had adapted the per
curiam to a purpose diametrically opposed to its original use, produc-
ing per curiam opinions accompanied by as many as nine separate
opinions, each asserting a strong and independent position. In its
most elaborate incarnations, the per curiam finally became its own
antithesis, the vehicle for three of the Court's most challenging and
most splintered constitutional cases of this century.
Then, in eight days in December 2000, the Supreme Court added a
dramatic new chapter to the history of the per curiam opinion. As
George W. Bush and Albert Gore, Jr. jostled for legal advantage in
resolving the disputed presidential election results in Florida, the
country speculated about the role the Supreme Court was likely to
play and the way each Justice might vote. Twice the Court granted
certiorari petitions from Governor Bush to review decisions of the
Florida Supreme Court permitting vote recounts to go forward, and
twice, after accelerated briefing and oral argument schedules, the
Court issued prompt per curiam opinions. On December 4th, the first
of these opinions, Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board,9 va-
cated the Florida court opinion and remanded for clarification, a
muted task well-suited to the modest role usually assigned the per
curiam. The second opinion, however, Bush v. Gore,10 was far less
modest. It effectively concluded the election in favor of Governor Bush
by identifying an equal protection violation in the recount process and
precluding any further recount on the grounds that it was too late to
anonymity the only way to achieve unanimity." B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON APPEL-
LATE COURT OPINIONS 254 (1977).
9. 121 S. Ct. 471 (2000).
10. 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000).
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complete a constitutionally acceptable process before a December 12th
deadline set by federal law.
The Court had never before resolved a presidential election, and it
had rarely if ever performed its opinion-writing role in the glare of
such avid and sustained attention from the media and the nation.
Yet, when the opinion emerged, in another departure from the Court's
usual methodical practice, shortly before 10:00 p.m. on December
12th, it too proved to be a per curiam with no indication of authorship.
The Court's unsigned opinion was accompanied by one concurrence
and four dissents, so there was little difficulty in understanding the
positions taken explicitly by seven of the Justices and deducing the
positions of their two silent colleagues. Yet, at this extraordinary mo-
ment in American history, when the Court assumed an unprecedented
role as arbiter of the presidential election, it chose to speak collectively
in the most self-effacing judicial form available to it. Why did the
Court issue its historic opinion as a per curiam? The answer to that
question lies at the end of a long and largely unexamined road, the
Court's evolving use of the per curiam opinion as a flexible and strate-
gic instrument of Supreme Court jurisprudence over the past one hun-
dred and forty years.
Viewed against the backdrop of the Court's increasingly individu-
alized opinion writing, the evolution of the per curiam encapsulates
the larger history of the Court's refinement of its decisionmaking role.
An examination of the ways in which the Court has adapted the per
curiam to its changing needs will also chart the uneven course of the
Court's continuing struggle to balance its institutional role as an
agent of consensus against the demands of its Justices for individual
expression.
II. THE HISTORY OF THE PER CURIAM OPINION AS
A FORM OF JUDICIAL EXPRESSION
A. The Background: An Instrument of Consensus
The Supreme Court's first officially designated per curiam opinion
to be published appeared in 1862, when the Court in Mesa v. United
Statesll proclaimed, "Let this appeal be dismissed" for failure to file a
transcript within the congressionally prescribed time.1 2 The opinion
11. 67 U.S. 721 (1862).
12. Id. at 722. In its earliest years and later under Chief Justice Marshall, the Court
issued opinions without indicating authorship. See John P. Kelsh, The Opinion
Delivery Practices of the United States Supreme Court 1790-1945, 77 WASH. U.
L.Q. 137, 145 (1999). These opinions were not, however, designated "per curiam"
and are not included in the opinion tables (specifically, Table 9) compiled by
Blaustein and Mersky in their statistical study of the Court. See BLAUSTEIN &
MNERsKy, supra note 6, at 137-38. According to one group of scholars who have
studied the per curiam, "[t]he Court's changes and occasional inconsistency in the
20001
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was a bare forty-two words and, beyond its initial command, contained
only one other sentence. It resolved a motion, apparently without oral
argument, and occupied less than a page in U.S. Reports. It was, in
short, an efficient method of disposing of a routine matter with a mini-
mal amount of judicial exertion. Mesa was not, however, the Court's
first use of the heading. That honor belongs to West v. Brashear,1 3 a
motion decision restoring a case to the docket, that somehow was over-
looked when it was issued in 1839. Fifty years later, West was pub-
lished in the appendix to Volume 131 as one of the "Omitted Cases
Now Reported In Full."1 4
In the years that followed Mesa, the Court found additional uses
for per curiam opinions in resolving such routine matters as dismis-
sals for lack of jurisdiction, grants or denials of certiorari petitions,
and a range of motion decisions. Some twenty-five years after Mesa,
the Court began to include on occasion a brief explanation of the basis
for its result. In 1889, in Sherman v. Robertson,i5 the Court for the
first time cited to precedent as the ground for reversal in a per curiam
opinion, a practice that soon became entrenched and continues to the
present.i6 By the early years of the twentieth century, the Court rou-
tinely used the per curiam to dismiss cases and to affirm or reverse
decisions below.17 All of these opinions were quite brief, and they
often were not even a complete sentence. is On rare occasions, a
decison might contain more than a single paragraph, although not a
sustained argument. Thus, the per curiam opinion for United States
use of the per curiam label means that examining these rulings is somewhat like
shooting at a moving target." Washy et al., supra note 8, at 32. In the interest of
achieving what consistency is possible, I have included in my study only those
opinions labeled "per curiam."
13. 131 U.S. app. at lxvi (1839).
14. West is the earliest of the omitted cases included by J.C. Bancroft Davis, Reporter
to the Court, in the "Appendix to the Reports of the Decisions" included in Vol-
ume 131. The decision is also reprinted in Volume 76 of the Lawyers' Edition
under an explanatory note indicating that "[i]n the preparation of cases for publi-
cation in the Lawyers' Edition of the Supreme Court Reports, several hundred
early cases were discovered and included therein which had never before been
published. A very few cases, however, were not included in their proper place,
and they are accordingly grouped in this appendix in order that the Lawyers'
Edition shall contain every case decided." 76 L. Ed. 1341 (1889).
15. 136 U.S. 570 (1889).
16. The Court noted briefly that the case was "Reversed with costs, on the authority of
the decision of this court in the case of Hartranft v. Oliver, (No. 190 of October
term 1887), 125 U.S. 525." Id. at 571.
17. See, e.g., Boyett v. United States, 207 U.S. 581 (1907)(reversing judgment below);
Baird v. Monroe, 207 U.S. 580 (1907)(dismissing for want of jurisdiction); Galban
& Co. v. United States, 207 U.S. 579 (1907)(affirming judgment below).
18. See, e.g., Wilson v. Erie R.R. Co., 209 U.S. 540 (1908)("Dismissed for the want of
jurisdiction"); Boyd v. Texas, 209 U.S. 539 (1908)("Writ of error dismissed for the
want of jurisdiction").
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v. Marvin'9 covers three pages, but most of the text consists of a quo-
tation from the findings of fact and conclusion of law of the court be-
low. 20 In a half page, the Court does, uncharacteristically, summarize
the positions submitted in writing by counsel, but the Court's own res-
olution consists of two sentences: the first cites to the cases in which
"W[the various applicable statutory provisions will be found," and the
second accepts the lower court's use of precedent and affirms its judg-
ment.2 1 The opinion, though lacking in sustained argument, nonethe-
less signals a shift from cursory case resolution toward the more fully
developed opinions of argued cases.
That shift was significantly advanced when, in the 1934 Term, the
Court began using the per curiam to resolve cases on the merits. Vol-
ume 295 of U.S. Reports contains four cases, all argued to the Court,
which are either affirmed or reversed by per curiams issued within
two weeks of oral argument. Two of these opinions, one slightly less
than two pages and the other a half page, directly address the sub-
stantive issues raised by the decisions below.2 2 In Stanley v. Public
Utilities Commission,23 the Court discussed the discretion appropriate
to a state legislature in regulating carriers for hire and found no
transgression.2 4 The second opinion, Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v.
United States,25 addressed the merits more succinctly and found or-
ders of the Interstate Commerce Commission adequately supported by
the Commission's findings.26 The decisions are unexceptional in
themselves, but they represent the adaptation of the per curiam to a
new use, the resolution of significant issues in a condensed format. It
is worth noting that both cases concern aspects of the Court's New
Deal agenda - determining the reach of regulatory power in legisla-
tures and administrative agencies. The per curiam allowed the Court
at once to signal that these cases warranted some exposition but were
nonetheless so easily decided that they did not require the more elabo-
rate presentation of a signed opinion.
The shifting role of the per curiam is reflected as well in the chang-
ing placement of the opinions. The early per curiams appeared in the
19. 212 U.S. 275 (1909).
20. See id. at 275-77.
21. Id. at 277.
22. In one case, Fox v. Gulf Refining Co., 295 U.S. 75 (1935), the Court remanded the
case to the district court with instructions to consider an unresolved issue "com-
posed as above stated" in the per curiam. Id. at 76. In the other, Hollins v.
Oklahoma, 295 U.S. 394 (1935), the Court again remanded a Fourteenth Amend-
ment claim based on exclusion of blacks from a criminal jury, this time with di-
rections to apply the principles set forth in two earlier Court decisions. Id. at
395.
23. 295 U.S. 76 (1935).
24. See id. at 77.
25. 295 U.S. 395 (1935).
26. See id. at 396.
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rear section of U.S. Reports, together with other briefly noted resolu-
tions of motions, under the heading "Decisions announced without
Opinions."27 As the per curiams became more numerous, they were
given a section of their own for the first time in the October 1902
Term, designated simply "Opinions Per Curiam." 28 Almost twenty
years later, per curiams began to appear as well in the main section of
the volume,29 although it took another decade before that became a
regular practice. In United States v. Malcolm,30 for example, the
Court set forth in its entirety a certification from the court below
before succinctly answering the questions;31 the opinion appeared im-
mediately before the separate section used for the briefer per curiams.
Per curiams coexisted in both the main section of the volume and their
own separately labeled section at the rear until the 1957 Term, when
the heading was dropped, although per curiams continued to appear,
grouped together, at the rear of volumes for several years thereafter.32
B. The Transformation: The Decline of Consensus
Changes in the length and placement of per curiams, though nota-
ble stages in their evolution, pale in significance beside the dramatic
shift from an opinion, however brief, literally supported by the entire
Court to an opinion that carries on its face the disagreement of some
Justices. For much of its history, the per curiam was unaccompanied
by any indications of such divergence. The first dissent from a per
curiam was authored, appropriately, by the Great Dissenter himself,
Oliver Wendell Holmes, in the 1909 case of Chicago, Burlington and
Quincy Railway Co. v. Williams,3 3 before the Court on a certificate
from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. In its per curiam, the Court
spent three pages setting forth the questions of law certified by the
27. See, e.g., Decisions Announced Without Opinions During the Time Covered by
Volumes 185 and 186, 186 U.S. 479 (1902). A typical entry reads: "Judgment
affirmed, with costs, on the authority of St. Louis & San Francisco Railway Com-
pany v. James ... ." Walters v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 186 U.S
479 (1902).
28. See Opinions Per Curiam, 187 U.S. 635 (1902).
29. In Ex Parte Tracy, for example, the Court in slightly more than a page denied a
motion to file a habeas corpus petition while explaining that, since other relief
was available to the petitioner, there was no need for habeas. See Ex Parte Tracy,
249 U.S. 551, 551-52 (1919).
30. 282 U.S. 792 (1931).
31. See id. at 794; see also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Batesville Tel. Co., 284 U.S. 6
(1931)(dismissing an appeal and explaining that the case did not fall within the
authorizing statute and therefore a petition for certiorari was necessary).
32. Compare Decisions Per Curiam and Orders June 10 through July 11, 1957, 354
U.S. 901 (1957), with the per curiam opinions grouped together, though without
an introductory heading, at 345 U.S. 600-08. On the placement of per curiam
opinions, see Wasby et al., supra note 8, at 32.
33. 214 U.S. 492 (1909).
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lower court before concluding that the certificate before it was "essen-
tially the same as that disposed of' when the case had earlier been
heard by the Court and that the present matter should be dismissed
based on the earlier resolution. In his one paragraph dissent, joined
by Justices White and Moody, Holmes initially noted his reluctance to
dissent "when it does not seem that an important principle is involved
or that there is some public advantage to be gained from a statement
of the other side."34 He had therefore joined the Court's determina-
tion when the case was first before it that the questions certified were
not within the statute giving the Court jurisdiction to resolve them.
Since the present certificate in his view contained questions of pure
law, the Court had jurisdiction and should respond.3 5 Holmes thus at
the same time assumed the modest stance of a reluctant dissenter
and, sub silentio, changed the per curiam from a decision of absolute
consensus to one of asserted disagreement.
Holmes's groundbreaking gesture of writing separately in a per
curiam case was, surprisingly, not followed for more than two decades,
and even then it was in a significantly less emphatic manner. The
Court had dismissed the writ of certiorari in Broad River Power Co. v.
South Carolina36 for lack of jurisdiction in a unanimous opinion au-
thored by Justice Stone. On rehearing, the Court announced in its per
curiam that it had reached the same result but that "the members of
the Court differ in the reasons which lead to that decision."37 Two
separate statements followed, each supported by four Justices, with
one Justice not participating. Instead of opinions written in the first
person, each statement was formulated in the third person. Thus,
"Mr. Justice Van Devanter, Mr. Justice McReynolds, Mr. Justice
Sutherland and Mr. Justice Butler concur in this disposition of the
case, upon the rehearing, for the following reasons," while "The Chief
Justice, Mr. Justice Holmes, Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice
Stone adhere to the views expressed" in the Court's prior opinion.38 In
Broad River Power, the impersonality of the per curiam becomes in-
stead a thin mask for the clearly articulated disagreement of equal
blocs of Justices.
Although a few intervening cases carried terse third party state-
ments of disagreement, 39 the first full-fledged dissenting opinion at-
tached to a per curiam appeared early in 1938, only three months
34. Id. at 495 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
35. See id. at 496.
36. 281 U.S. 537 (1930).
37. Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 282 U.S. 187, 192 (1930).
38. Id. at 192-93.
39. See, e.g., Valentine v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 299 U.S. 32, 33
(1936)("Mr. Justice Brandeis and Mr. Justice Cardozo dissent."); Cate v. Beasley,
299 U.S. 30, 32 (1936)("MAr. Justice Reynolds is of opinion that the challenged
judgment should be reversed.").
2000] 525
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after its author, Justice Black, joined the Court.40 In McCart v. Indi-
anapolis Water Co.,41 the Court's per curiam opinion, authored by
Chief Justice Hughes,4 2 spent barely four pages affirming an appeals
court decision that ordered farther district court review of water rates
set by the Public Service Commission of Indiana.43 In a solitary dis-
sent of almost eighteen pages, Justice Black strongly attacked the
Court's result on several grounds, most prominently the limited role
assigned the federal courts in reviewing regulation of rates for intra-
state utilities.4 4 "I believe," he concluded, "the State of Indiana has
the right to regulate the price of water in Indianapolis free from inter-
ference by federal courts."45 Black's dissent also, unsurprisingly, car-
ried populist overtones in its concern for the people of Indianapolis
who, in his view, "[were] already compelled to pay an unjustifiable
price for their water on account of previous judicial over-valuation of
this property."46 The boldness of the lengthy dissent to the Chief Jus-
tice's per curiam provoked concern on the Court, prompting Justice
Stone to send Hughes a mysterious message: "I see in Justice Black's
dissent the handiwork of someone other than the nominal author."47
Black's subsequent record as author of concurrences and dissents indi-
cates that Stone had misjudged his colleague.
As a new arrival from the Senate, where he passionately supported
the New Deal agenda, Black showed none of the tendency of Justices
in their first term on the Court to proceed cautiously and accept the
guidance of their senior colleagues. A figure of great energy and ambi-
tion, Black launched his judicial career by writing a lengthy and de-
tailed refutation of an opinion the other seven participating Justices
thought required little elaboration or argument.48 Black brought to
40. See McCart v. Indianapolis Water Co., 302 U.S. 419 (1938). The case was argued
on December 15, 1937, and decided on January 3, 1938. Justice Black was ap-
pointed by President Roosevelt on August 12, 1937, confirmed by the Senate on
August 17, and sworn in as Associate Justice on August 19. He took his seat on
the Court for the first time on October 4, 1937. See Justices of the Supreme Court
During the Time of these Reports, 302 U.S. III n.3 (1937).
41. 302 U.S. 419 (1938).
42. See ROGER K. NEwMAN, HUGO BLAcK: A BIOGRAPHY 273 (2d ed. 1997).
43. See McCart, 302 U.S. at 422-23. On remand, the district court was directed to
conduct a new hearing to determine whether the rates set by the Commission
were, in light of an accurate valuation of the water company's property, confisca-
tory. See id.
44. See id. at 423-24 (Black, J., dissenting).
45. Id. at 441.
46. Id.
47. NEwmAN, supra note 42, at 273-74. According to Newman, Stone's reference "is
unknown, but soon rumors started popping up in Washington that Ben Cohen
and Tom Corcoran were writing Black's opinions .... Anyone who knew Black
even slightly would have guffawed at the suggestion." Id. at 274.
48. Justice Cardozo did not participate in the decision of the case. See McCart, 302
U.S. at 423.
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the Court a powerful sense of judicial individuality and a reluctance to
submerge his own views. In the first paragraph of his opinion, he
notes that "[t]he importance of the questions here involved leads me to
set out some of my reasons for" dissenting.49 Black's willingness to
stake out his own territory in effect completed the transformation of
the per curiam from its original role as an instrument of consensus to
its new role as another judicial battleground for the ideological battles
to follow within the Roosevelt Court and its successors.
Justice Black was the first Roosevelt appointee to the Court, and
he was followed to the bench in quick succession by Stanley Reed in
1938, Felix Frankfurter and William 0. Douglas in 1939, Frank Mur-
phy in 1940, James F. Byrnes and Robert H. Jackson in 1941, and
Wiley Rutledge in 1943.5o Although most of Roosevelt's choices were
strong-willed and highly individualistic, Black and Douglas were the
two Justices who consistently appended dissents or, less frequently,
concurrences, to per curiam opinions. In his thirty-four years on the
Court, Black authored twenty dissents and three concurrences, while
Reed, for example, added only one dissent in nineteen years, and
Frankfurter added seven dissents and seven concurrences in twenty-
three years. Even Black's substantial numbers pale when compared
to Douglas's performance. In his thirty-six year tenure on the Court,
the longest of any Justice, Douglas wrote seventy-one dissents from
per curiams, twenty-one concurrences, and five opinions simply la-
beled "separate." Together, Black and Douglas led the Court toward a
model of decisionmaking that never hesitated to disturb consensus
opinions with statements of individual views.
As the practice of adding separate opinions to per curiams became
established, the Justices in the 1940s added other refinements to their
use of the per curiam. Not all separate opinions were conventionally
labeled. In one 1943 case, for example, three Justices joined in a brief
third party statement disagreeing with the Court but not using the
word "dissent," while Justice Jackson wrote a separate concurrence
referring to the three as "the dissenting Justices."51 Other variations
included a separate opinion labeled neither dissent nor concurrence; 52
49. 1&
50. See THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 969
(Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992). In 1941 Roosevelt elevated Harlan F. Stone, a Calvin
Coolidge appointee, from Associate Justice to Chief Justice. See id.
51. United States v. Swift & Co., 318 U.S. 442, 446 (1943). The three Justices were
Black, Douglas, and Murphy. See id.
52. See New York ex rel. Whitman v. Wilson, 318 U.S. 688, 691 (1943). The opinion
was written by Justice Frankfurter and joined by Justices Roberts and Reed. See
id. at 692. Another example of this type of opinion is Justice Douglas's separate
opinion in NAACP v. Williams, 359 U.S. 550 (1959). Douglas opens by saying
that "w]ith some doubts I bow to the conclusion" of the per curiam concerning the
finality of the judgment below and after a brief discussion concludes that "I acqui-
esce in the denial of certiorari at this stage of the proceedings." Id. at 550-51.
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jointly authored separate opinions;53 a per curiam announced by Jus-
tice Douglas, who had also authored a signed opinion for a related
case;54 and the growing tendency of Justices to join one another's sep-
arate opinions. 55 This tendency to join finally led in the 1960s to a per
curiam opinion issued by the most closely divided Court possible: in
Niukkanen v. McAlexander5 6 the Court issued a per curiam, but it
nevertheless divided five to four, with three Justices joining a dissent
by Douglas.57
At the same time a complementary tendency of some Justices to
fine-tune their separate views in per curiam cases emerged. By 1963,
the practice of appending opinions that both concurred and dissented
had begun. In a case that year, Justice Harlan filed an opinion con-
curring in part and dissenting in part; he believed that certiorari
should not have been granted, accepted the Court's result, but dis-
agreed with its rationale.5 8 The Justices also began to note partial
agreement with per curiams. Thus, in 1964 Justice Douglas filed an
opinion concurring in part with the Court's per curiam,5 9 and more
Douglas never uses the words dissent or concur. See also Mackey v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 362 U.S. 384, 387 (1960), where Justice Frankfurter's opinion is la-
beled "Separate memorandum" and does not refer to a dissent or concurrence.
53. The first jointly authored separate opinion was a dissent signed by Chief Justice
Vinson and Justices Reed and Jackson. See United States v. Capital Transit Co.,
338 U.S. 286, 291 (1949). For other examples, see Antone v. Dugger, 465 U.S.
200, 207 (1984)(Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting); Woodard v. Hutchins, 464
U.S. 377, 383 (1984)(White and Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Lee v. Washington, 390
U.S. 333, 334 (1968)(Black, Harlan, and Stewart, JJ., concurring). In one case,
Justices Frankfurter and Harlan filed a brief joint statement when the per
curiam was issued, noting their "intention to file in due course an amplification of
our views," and, a month later, filed a lengthy joint concurring opinion. United
Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 44 (1959)(Frankfurter and Harlan,
JJ., concurring).
54. See Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103, 104 (1943). The companion case was Mur-
dock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and the dissents in that case are refer-
enced in Opelika.
55. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 319 U.S. 33, 36, 38 (1943)(Jackson, J., dissent-
ing, joined by Reed, J.); Mackey v. Mendoza-Martinez, 362 U.S. 384, 388
(1960)(Clark, J., dissenting, joined by Harlan and Whittaker, JJ.).
56. 362 U.S. 390 (1960).
57. See id. Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Brennan joined in the Doug-
las dissent. See id. at 391.
58. See Eichel v. New York Cent. R.R. Co., 375 U.S. 253, 256 (1963)(Harlan, J., con-
curring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Douglas concurred in the Court's
result without an opinion. See id. For similar opinions, see also Simpson v.
Union Oil Co., 396 U.S. 13, 15 (1969)(Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part); Darwin v. Connecticut, 391 U.S. 346, 350 (1968)(Harlan, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
59. See Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 402
(1964)(Douglas, J., concurring in part). In Delo v. Stokes, 495 U.S. 320, 323
(1990)(Brennan, J., dissenting), Justice Marshall joined Brennan's entire dissent
from the Court's reversal of a stay of execution, but Justice Blackmun joined only
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recently Justice Souter indicated, without opinion, that he joined only
Part I of the Court's opinion.60 In the 1970s separate opinions began
to proliferate. A 1977 per curiam, for example, carried with it a con-
currence by Justice Blackmun and separate dissents by Justices Bren-
nan, Stewart, and Stevens. 61 With the joinder of various opinions by
the five other Justices, all nine members of the Court registered views
beyond the scope of the per curiam.
The grouping and regrouping of the Justices in a complicated 1986
case, Bazemore v. Friday,62 demonstrated how flexible and capable of
incorporating diverse positions the per curiam had become. All nine
Justices joined Justice Brennan's lengthy partial concurrence which,
inter alia, overturned the lower court's rejection of the statistical evi-
dence submitted by plaintiffs claiming racial discrimination by the
North Carolina Extension Service.6 3 Four Justices then joined Justice
White's concurrence finding that the Extension Service had met its
constitutional and statutory duty to eliminate discrimination, 64 while
the remaining three joined Justice Brennan's second separate opinion,
a partial dissent finding a broader unmet duty to desegregate.6 5 The
per curiam opinion endorsed the results of both concurrences, explain-
ing in each instance that it so held "for the reasons stated in" the
Brennan and White opinions. 6 6 White could have written a signed
opinion for the Court incorporating both concurrences, and Brennan
could have written a single opinion concurring and dissenting in part.
Instead, the Court allowed Brennan's unanimous concurrence to fol-
low a per curiam, hinting at a subtle but unexplained distinction be-
tween what the Court itself held and what all of its members believed.
This elusive distinction recalls what may be the most delicate re-
finement of a Justice's separate response to a per curiam. In O'Keeffe
"as to Parts 1, 11, and I1." 495 U.S. at 323. The section Blackmun declined to join
contained a restatement of Brennan's long held view that the death penalty vio-
lated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. See id. at 327.
60. See Delo v. Lashley, 507 U.S. 272, 272 (1993).
61. See Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624, 629, 631 (1977)(Blackmun, J., concurring; Bren-
nan, J., dissenting; Stewart, J., dissenting;, Stevens, J., dissenting). For another
case with four separate opinions, see Baldasar v. Illinois, 446 U.S. 222, 224, 229,
230 (1980), where Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Blackmun wrote concurring
opinions and Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion. Justices Brennan and
Stevens joined both the Stewart and Marshall opinions, while Chief Justice Bur-
ger and Justices White and Rehnquist joined the Powell dissent. See Baldasar,
446 U.S. at 224, 230. Thus, all nine Justices registered separate positions.
62. 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
63. See id. at 388, 397-404 (Brennan, J., concurring in part).
64. See id. at 407 (White, J., concurring). White was joined by Burger, Powell, Rehn-
quist, and O'Connor. See id.
65. See id. at 409 (Brennan, J., dissenting in part). Brennan was joined by Marshall,
Blackmun, and Stevens. See id.
66. See id. at 386-87.
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v. Smith, Hinchman, & Grylls Associates, Inc.,67 Justice Douglas ap-
pended an opinion "dubitante" to a per curiam upholding a ruling by
the Deputy Commissioner of the Bureau of Employees' Compensa-
tion.68 Douglas noted that, unlike the Court, he would not be "in-
clined to reverse a Court of Appeals that disagreed with a Deputy
Commissioner over findings as exotic as we have here."69 It is not
surprising that Douglas, the most supremely individualistic Justice of
this century, is the author of one of the handful of opinions dubitante
recorded in U.S. Reports, but it is significant that the anomaly ap-
pears in a per curiam case, signaling that even a Justice who doubts
his own tentative position is more inclined to express it in writing
than to join a supposedly clear-cut opinion.70
III. THE PER CURIAM AND THE IDEA OF INDIVIDUALISM
A. The Emergence of the Separate Voice
It is no coincidence that the per curiam, originally an instrument of
pure consensus, first became a judicial vehicle for individual expres-
sion during the Roosevelt Court. In its earliest years the Supreme
Court had functioned as a highly individualistic body, with the Jus-
67. 380 U.S. 359 (1965).
68. See id. at 371 (Douglas, J., dubitante). Justice Harlan dissented from the Court's
opinion, joined by Justices Clark and White. See id. at 365 (Harlan, J., dissent-
ing). An opinion dubitante is one "indicating the judge doubted a legal point but
was unwilling to state that it was wrong." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 515 (7th ed.
1999).
69. O'Keeffe, 380 U.S. at 372.
70. In addition to O'Keeffe, only two other opinions have been formally presented as
dubitante. In Case-Swayne Co. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 389 U.S. 384 (1967),
Douglas filed another opinion dubitante, noting that he was "not as certain as Mr.
Justice White" concerning an issue in the case and therefore preferred to reserve
certain questions. Id. at 403 (Douglas, J., dubitante)(emphasis omitted). The
only other such opinion-and the earliest-was written by Justice Frankfurter.
See Radio Corp. of America v. United States, 341 U.S. 412, 421 (1951). Frank-
furter opened his opinion with the following expression of doubt: "Since I am not
alone in entertaining doubts about this case they had better be stated." Id. The
only other Justice to use the term to classify an opinion, though in a more indirect
manner, was a third Roosevelt Court appointee, Wiley Rutledge. A 1949 case
contained the notation that "Mr. Justice Rutledge acquiesces in the Court's opin-
ion and judgment, dubitante on the question of equal protection of the laws."
Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106, 111 (1949)(emphasis
omitted). Two years earlier he had opened a concurring opinion by stating, "I join
in the judgment dubitante." New York ex rel. Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 619
(1947)(Rutledge, J., concurring). For two uses of the term in the text of separate
opinions, see Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 308 (1973)(White, J., concur-
ring). White noted that he was "inclined, although dubitante, to conclude with
the Court that we have jurisdiction." Id. at 307-08. Douglas's third use of the
term occurred in 1961. See International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S.
740, 779 (1961)(Douglas, J., concurring). He "concluded dubitante to agree" to thejudgment suggested by Justice Brennan. Id.
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tices writing their opinions seriatim and leaving the determination of
the Court's holding, as in the English system, to the readers of the
Justices' multiple opinions. With the arrival of John Marshall as
Chief Justice, that potent individualism was reined in by a leader who
insisted on speaking for a unified Court, even at the cost of vigorously
suppressing the disagreement of colleagues. 71 Marshall's disciplined
leadership solidified and increased the Court's power, but it also
shaped a Court that continued to value its collective institutional
power above the independent voices of its members and thus, into the
start of the twentienth century, discouraged dissent. Even Holmes,
who achieved a popular reputation as a ready dissenter, expressed his
distaste for the practice and in fact contributed only seventy-two dis-
senting opinions over a Court career of almost thirty years.72
This traditional model for the Court-eight Associate Justices ac-
cepting the guidance of a respected Chief Justice and working toward
consensus-continued into the twentieth century under the tenure of
Charles Evans Hughes, regarded by many who served under him as
an exemplary leader. Hughes was celebrated for running the Justices'
conferences with a strong hand by shaping the discussion of cases
with his introductory remarks and limiting the time for discussion of
independent views.7 3 The result was a lean, efficient process that
71. When Justice William Johnson brought to the Supreme Court the custom of dis-
sent prevailing at his Virginia court, his colleagues reproached him. As Johnson
reported in an 1822 letter to Thomas Jefferson:
[D]uring the rest of the session I heard nothing but lectures on the inde-
cency of judges cutting at each other, and the loss of reputation which
the Virginia appellate court had sustained by pursuing such a course. At
length I found that I must either submit to circumstances or become
such a cypher in our consultations as to effect no good at all. I therefore
bent to the current, and persevered until I got them to adopt the course
they now pursue, which is to appoint someone to deliver the opinion of
the majority, but leave it to the discretion of the rest of the judges to
record their opinions or not ad libitum.
DONALD G. MORGAN, JUSTICE WILLIAIMI JOHNSON: THE FIRST DISSENTER 182 (1954)
(footnote omitted).
72. See David M. O'Brien, Institutional Norms and Supreme Court Opinions: On Re-
considering the Rise of Individual Opinions, in SuPREmE COURT DEcIsIoN-MAK-
ING 91,94 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard Gillman eds., 1999). O'Brien calculates
that Holmes averaged 2.4 dissents per Term. See id. On Holmes's role as a dis-
senter, see also Ray, Jurisprudence of Dissent, supra note 6, at 310.
73. According to Justice Douglas, a member of the Hughes Court for two years,
Hughes "was most efficient. The Conference started at noon, and no matter how
long the Conference List, we were usually through by four-thirty or five. The
discussions were short; Hughes's statements were always succinct." WILLIAm 0.
DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 222 (1980). For an account of Hughes's method of
conducting the Court's conference, see 2 MERLo J. PUSEY, CHARLEs EVANS
HUGHES 672-73 (1951). According to Pusey, "[e]xcept at the beginning of a new
term, when several conferences were necessary to dispose of the petitions for cer-
tiorari accumulated during the summer, Hughes always insisted on finishing all
the business before the conference at a single session." Id. at 673. For another
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Hughes could describe to Congress, in the heat of the court packing
battle, as keeping the Court abreast of its docket despite the advanced
age of many of its members. 74 Hughes's leadership was not, however,
universally appreciated. As an Associate Justice, Harlan Stone, a for-
mer academic who enjoyed extended debate, chafed at the restrictions
imposed under the Hughes regime. When Roosevelt elevated Stone to
succeed Hughes in 1941, the new Chief Justice implemented his own
preferred approach, allowing extended debate at conferences that
dragged on over several days, often to the despair of his otherwise
sympathetic colleagues. 75 The Stone Court, unlike the Hughes Court,
put individual voice before institutional efficiency.
In this respect the administrative aspect of the Court reflected the
substantive divergences that marked the Court in the 1930s, espe-
cially the deep rifts between conservatives and liberals that were re-
solved, though not ended, by the constitutional revolution of 1937.
That story has been told many times, most masterfully by William
Leuchtenberg, and it chronicles the bitter divisions on the Court be-
tween the conservative Four Horsemen and their opponents, the Jus-
tices who endorsed an expanded vision of federal legislative power.76
The Roosevelt Justices, many of whom came from government posi-
tions or academia, brought to the bench their strong personalities,
personal ambitions, and reluctance to compromise.7 7 They clashed
with such stalwarts of the prior generation as Justice McReynolds,
whose abrasive personality and conservative views made him a diffi-
cult colleague, but they also clashed with one another. Even as
Roosevelt populated the Court with nine appointees, the anticipated
return to consensus remained elusive. As the 1930s gave way to the
1940s, the Roosevelt Court itself divided between separate alliances-
Black and Douglas, Frankfurter and Jackson-that precluded the
tempering of individual views in the service of institutional
harmony.7 8
discussion of Chief Justices Hughes, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME
COURT: How IT WAS, How IT Is 291-92 (1987).
74. See WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN 140-41 (1995).
75. Douglas described Stone as "first, last and always, a professor who wanted to
search out every point and unravel every skein." DOUGLAS, supra note 73, at 222.
With Stone as Chief Justice, "our Conference was never finished by four-thirty or
five. We moved the starting time back, first to eleven and then to ten o'clock, but
we still could not finish by six on Saturday .... He believed in free speech for
everybody, including himself." Id. at 223.
76. See generally LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 74.
77. See O'Brien, supra note 72, at 100.
78. On the divisions and alliances within the Roosevelt Court, see PRITCHETT, supra
note 7, at 240-63.
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B. The Pursuit of Consensus
The convergence of these three strains-the jurisprudential, the
administrative, and the temperamental-combined to reconstitute
the Court as a confederation of individualists. In the absence of a
strong and respected Chief Justice, which was the state of affairs dur-
ing the brief tenure of Fred Vinson, there was little chance of achiev-
ing consensus on a controversial issue like school desegregation. 79
When Brown v. Board of Education came before the Vinson Court, the
tentative vote revealed such a serious division that the best option for
the Justices hoping to strike down school segregation as unconstitu-
tional was a maneuver to have the case put over for reargument.SO
After Vinson's unexpected death led to Earl Warren's appointment as
Chief Justice, the Court acquired a strong and politically savvy leader
who commanded the respect and even the affection of the Justices.
Even so, Warren's determination to achieve a unanimous decision in
Brown required a prolonged and delicate campaign executed with the
consummate skill of an experienced politician rather than the ex cath-
edra style of leadership that had worked for Marshall and, in a modi-
fied form, for Hughes as well.
The wooing of Stanley Reed as the ninth vote essential for unanim-
ity was the culmination of that campaign, and it reveals the blending
of the institutional and the personal in shaping Court consensus by
the middle of the twentieth century. Since Warren understood that
Reed, a Kentuckian, did not believe that the doctrine of separate but
equal was unconstitutional, Warren's approach to his colleague was
more personal than jurisprudential. He arranged a series of lunches,
most attended by Justices Burton and Minton, the least threatening
among a bench of imposing and largely intransigent Justices, at which
Warren tried to persuade Reed to accept the position of his col-
leagues. 81 When Reed remained unconvinced, Warren couched his fi-
nal appeal in the language of institutional need. As recounted by
Bernard Schwartz, Warren presented Reed with the stark choice be-
tween undermining the Court's authority on an explosive issue or
holding to his own position: "'Stan, you're all by yourself in this now.
You've got to decide whether it's really the best thing for the coun-
79. Bernard Schwartz believes that "Fred M. Vinson may have been the least effec-
tive Court head in the Supreme Court's history." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, A HISTORY
OF THE SuPEAim COURT 253 (1993). He lacked both the intellectual power and
the administrative ability to lead a Court of highly intelligent and assertive Jus-
tices toward consensus and, under his leadership, "the Vinson Court was the
most fragmented in the Court's history." Id. at 254.
80. The account of the Court's resolution of Brown is based on two major sources,
BERNARD SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF 72-127 (1983), and RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE 657-99 (1976).
81. See SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 80, at 90. Schwartz sees the luncheon
strategy as evidence of "Warren's instinct for effective leadership." Id.
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try."'8 2 Reed voted with the Court, but he did so out of institutional
responsibility and regard for Warren, not personal conviction. The ep-
isode is a moving one-Reed reportedly had tears in his eyes as War-
ren read the unanimous opinion from the bench 83-not least because
it harks back to a type of institutional decisionmaking not often seen
in the years since. Warren as Chief Justice was less interested in the
authenticity of Reed's commitment to the Court's position than he was
in the consequences of a desegregation decision carrying a single dis-
sent by a southerner. Like John Marshall before him, Warren under-
stood the potential harm to both the country and the Court that a
splintered decision could provoke, and he succeeded in conveying that
message to the Court's last holdout. Reed's own willingness to follow
Warren by sacrificing one form of integrity for another, personal con-
viction for institutional solidarity, stands as one of the last triumphs
of the earlier model that placed consensus above individualism.
The next great effort to achieve judicial unanimity in a potentially
explosive case came twenty years later, when President Nixon chal-
lenged the Court's authority to order him to release the Watergate
tapes, and it illustrates the progress of the Court's shift from consen-
sus to individualism. The first striking difference between Brown and
United States v. Nixon is that the successful effort was led not by the
Chief Justice but by blocs of Associate Justices working against him to
secure a solid and persuasive opinion.84 Although the Justices agreed
among themselves that the decision had to be unanimous, they had
rejected Brennan's original suggestion that it be signed by all eight
Justices rather than by a single author.8 5 Once Chief Justice Burger
assigned the case to himself, his colleagues could only counter what
they considered to be his confused and inadequate drafts with their
own versions, circulated among themselves and presented to him as
their preferred text. Burger ultimately acquiesced, accepting most of
their contributions and claiming others as his own, but he emerged as
82. Id. at 94 (footnote omitted). Schwartz's source for the conversation was Reed's
law clerk, who witnessed it. Id. Kluger identifies the clerk as George Mickum
and quotes him as saying of Reed, "Because he was a Southerner, even a lone
dissent by him would give a lot of people a lot of grist for making trouble. For the
good of the country, he put aside his own basis for dissent.'" KLUGER, supra note
80, at 698.
83. See SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 80, at 105.
84. For a detailed account of the behind-the-scenes maneuvers that resulted in the
Court's unanimous opinion, see BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE
BRETHREN 287-347 (1979). For a brief account of the shaping of the Court's opin-
ion, see BERNARD SCHWARTZ, DECISION: How THE SUPREME COURT DECIDES CASES
145-48 (1996)[hereinafter SCHWARTZ, DECISION].
85. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 84, at 296, 309-10.
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the pawn of the Associate Justices, not their leader, the obstacle to
consensus rather than its architect.8 6
The second striking difference is the nature of the opinion pro-
duced. Although the opinion in Brown has occasioned a great deal of
comment and some criticism for its approach to the constitutional is-
sue posed by segregation, no one has questioned the coherence of War-
ren's vision. Warren instructed his law clerk that the opinion was to
be "'short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemotional
and, above all, non-accusatory,'" and the final product clearly matches
that description.8 7 It is, in short, the work of a single mind with a
clear strategic goal.88 The Court's opinion in United States v. Nixon,
on the other hand, has been aptly described by one Justice as the work
of a committee.8 9 Its doctrine is incompletely explained, its various
sections seem at times to have been (as they were) written by different
hands, and it is internally inconsistent in its varying emphases on
presidential privilege and judicial authority. The cost of achieving
consensus, even in the face of the Watergate crisis, was clearly steep,
and the effort of bringing together Justices who differed significantly
in the degree of respect they were willing to accord presidential power
appears in the sometimes strained and never fluent text. By 1974,
consensus was no longer a shared goal; rather, it was an occasional
political necessity that the Justices struggled among themselves to
forge from the diversity of their individual positions.
In the quarter century since United States v. Nixon, this shift from
consensus toward judicial individualism has progressed. Court deci-
sions today are frequently heavily splintered, with Justices choosing
among the sections of their colleagues' opinions, agreeing with some,
rejecting others, and offering their own takes on the issues at hand. A
concurrence may well begin "I write separately only to express" and
follow with the author's insistence on an individual or even idiosyn-
cratic position, often one that has been articulated in earlier cases and
rejected by other Justices. 90 The most significant counter-example to
this trend is Chief Justice Rehnquist who, since his elevation in 1986,
86. Schwartz titles his chapter on the Burger Court "The Court Leads the Chief."
SCHWARTZ, DECISION, supra note 84, at 135.
87. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 80, at 97. According to Schwartz, "[t]he draft
prepared by [Earl] Pollock from Warren's outline was basically the opinion read
by the Chief on May 17." Id.
88. When, a year later, the Court prepared to issue its second Brown opinion, this
time containing the mandate for enforcement, Frankfurter suggested "that the
opinion be an unsigned per curiam." Id. at 119. The Justices voted eight to one
for a second opinion signed by Warren. See id.
89. See ScmvARTZ, DECISION, supra note 84, at 147.
90. For an analysis of the ways in which the members of the Rehnquist Court have
used the concurrence, see Ray, Write Separately, supra note 6, at 784-809.
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has reduced his output of separate opinions dramatically.91 As Chief
Justice he places a higher premium on consensus than he did in his
earlier years as a renegade conservative on an inhospitably liberal
Court or as the leader of a nascent conservative majority.
IV. THE PER CURIAM AS A STRATEGIC DEVICE
The transformation of the Court's ruling principle from consensus
to individualism also transformed the per curiam from an impersonal
judicial instrument to its opposite, a judicial instrument useful pre-
cisely because it permitted the widest possible display of divergent
opinions. If the early per curiams left the reader unable to identify
the anonymous author who enjoyed the wholehearted support of the
other eight Justices, by the 1970s, the Burger Court years, the per
curiam at times left the reader puzzled by the gap between label and
content. On several occasions the Court turned to the per curiam to
resolve high-profile cases which raised difficult and controversial is-
sues on which the Justices held widely divergent positions. In some
instances the per curiam offered the Court a convenient way to defer
or accelerate the resolution of a case, but in others it seemed to raise
more questions than it answered. Why, if the Justices could agree on
only a bare paragraph, were they calling attention to their discord by
presenting it as a unified result accompanied by hefty separate opin-
ions? And why could no member of the Court be found to extract some
measure of consensus from the welter of differing views? Was the per
curiam the last resort for a Court that, unable to reach genuine agree-
ment, was determined to lay claim to the label as a substitute for the
reality?
Within this larger history of the per curiam's transformation is a
smaller history that illustrates the Court's expanding interest in the
potential of the per curiam as an adaptable judicial tool. The
Roosevelt Court, faced with challenging issues to decide and internal
conflicts to navigate, found the per curiam useful in meeting a number
of strategic goals. Since the per curiam traditionally carried a mes-
sage of clear-cut resolution and consensus, the Court increasingly
found that packaging a case in per curiam form allowed it to commu-
nicate that comfortable message while engaging in more complicated
acts of decisionmaking. As the Roosevelt Court of the 1940s gave way
to the Warren and Burger Courts, the per curiam played a steadily
91. According to the Harvard Law Review statistics that appear in each November
issue, Rehnquist, as an Associate Justice from 1972 to 1986, averaged 16.3 dis-
sents and 4.7 concurrences per term. As Chief Justice since 1986, he has aver-
aged 5.4 dissents and 1.4 concurrences per term. Even allowing for the Court's
shift to the right in recent years, which places Rehnquist less often in the minor-
ity than in his early years, the decline is still significant.
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more prominent role in the strategic presentation of cases of consider-
ably more than routine interest.
A. Achieving Efficiency
The Court began experimenting with the per curiam as a strategic
device in the 1940s, adapting it in Ex Parte Quirin92 to the unusual
demands imposed by the war. When eight German saboteurs were
captured in the United States and scheduled for trial by a military
commission, they sought to file habeas corpus petitions challenging
the constitutionality of a military trial. Responding to what Chief
Justice Stone characterized as "'the urgency of the case,'"9 3 the Su-
preme Court granted certiorari before judgment, heard oral argument
at a special term on July 29th and 30th, and only one day later, on
July 31st, released a brief per curiam upholding the validity of a mili-
tary trial. The petitioners' sentences, including six executions, were
carried out only a few days after the issuance of the per curiam.
Stone, who as usual was summering in New Hampshire, worked on
the full opinion in solitude, buoyed by his colleagues' unusual will to
unanimity in this dramatic case and at the same time constrained by
the demands of satisfying such divergent Justices. 94 The prompt per
curiam allowed the Court to resolve a serious issue with expedition in
the tense wartime atmosphere while still having the leisure to craft an
important precedent acceptable to all members of the Court. In a sim-
ilar post-war situation, when the Court was faced in 1948 with the
question of its jurisdiction to review the judgments of the Allied Pow-
ers' military tribunal in Japan, the per curiam again provided a way
for the Court to rule immediately.95 The case was resolved by a per
curiam issued on December 20, 1948, three days after the conclusion
of oral argument, but Douglas's concurring opinion did not appear un-
til June 27, 1949, over six months later.96 A delay occasioned by one
member of the Court did not prevent the resolution of a case with sig-
nificant international implications.
92. 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
93. ALPHEUS THOmAS MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PLAR OF THE LAw 657 (1956).
94. See id. at 659.
95. See Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197 (1948).
96. See i. While the per curiam was only three paragraphs, Douglas's concurrence
was sixteen pages long. See id. at 199-215 (Douglas, J., concurring). The case
also indicates that Justice Rutledge "reserves decision and the announcement of
his vote until a later time." Id. at 198. In fact, as a footnote clarifies, Rutledge




B. Working by Indirection
In the 1950s the Court discovered a new use for the per curiam as
an impersonal vehicle for resolving controversial cases without con-
fronting controversial issues. By presenting an opinion in the per
curiam mode, the Court sent a signal that any substantive discussion
was irrelevant, that the result was compelled not by the merits of
highly contested issues but rather by external factors that precluded
the Court from even addressing the merits. With no Justice signing
the opinion, there was no individual to be blamed for evading the
tough questions. The choice had been made by a faceless entity, a
kind of legal bureaucrat, and the opinion that conveyed that choice
seemed somehow less to be blamed for timidity than acknowledged for
doing its job.
The strategic use of the per curiam for purposes of evasion is illus-
trated by the Court's 1953 decision to uphold an increasingly shaky
thirty year-old precedent. In Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc.,97 the
Court was asked to revisit the question of baseball's exemption from
federal antitrust law, an exemption which had been established by a
1922 Oliver Wendell Holmes decision, Federal Baseball Club v. Na-
tional League of Professional Baseball Clubs.98 With two Justices dis-
senting, the Toolson Court, after full argument, decided that any
change in the status of baseball should be left to Congress and reaf-
firmed Federal Baseball "[w]ithout re-examination of the underlying
issues."9 9 Like earlier per curiams that simply made reference to
binding precedents, Toolson's reliance on stare decisis and deference
to Congress obviated the need for a developed opinion, at least in the
view of seven Justices.
But the one paragraph opinion provided something more than a
gesture of institutional respect for Holmes and Congress or, as the dis-
sent charged, a refusal to acknowledge fundamental changes in the
conduct of baseball that had fatally undermined the precedent.OO
Since Federal Baseball had ruled that baseball was not commerce, it
precluded Congress from regulating the sport under its Commerce
Clause power.lOl As Bernard Schwartz has documented, Chief Jus-
tice Warren objected that Justice Black's original draft per curiam did
97. 346 U.S. 356 (1953).
98. See 259 U.S. 200 (1922). Holmes found that "[tihe business [of] giving exhibitions
of base ball ... although made for money would not be called trade or commerce
in the commonly accepted use of those words." Id. at 208-09.
99. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357. Justice Burton filed a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice Reed. See id. at 357 (Burton, J., dissenting).
100. Justice Burton called it "a contradiction in terms to say that the defendants in
the cases before us are not now engaged in interstate trade or commerce as those
terms are used in the Constitution of the United States and in the Sherman Act."
Id. at 358.
101. See SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 80, at 162.
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not make clear that Congress had the power to regulate baseball
under federal antitrust law should it choose to do so.1 02 He proposed
additional language making that point, and Black agreed to incorpo-
rate it.103 Thus, Toolson ends by reaffirming Federal Baseball "so far
as that decision determines that Congress had no intention of includ-
ing the business of baseball within the scope of the federal antitrust
laws," leaving the door open for Congress to resolve the issue by stat-
ute.' 0 4 In Toolson, then, the per curiam that appears to do no more
than reaffirm a precedent in fact modifies that precedent, making new
law at the very moment that it apparently disclaims any intention of
addressing the merits.
The Court refined the use of the per curiam as a strategic instru-
ment of indirection in a series of cases seeking to expand desegrega-
tion of public facilities in the wake of Brown v. Board of Education.105
These cases were resolved by per curiam opinions of the most basic
variety. Not only did these opinions omit any discussion of the issue,
but they also declined even to identify the subject matter of the case.
In Mayor of Baltimore City v. Dawson,O06 for example, the Court noted
only that "[tihe motion to affirm is granted and the judgment is af-
firmed," thus effectively desegregating public beaches.i07 On the
same day, in Holmes v. City of Atlanta,i0 8 the Court desegregated
public golf courses, vacating the decisions below and remanding "with
directions to enter a decree for petitioners in conformity" with Daw-
son. 109 A year later the Court in Gayle v. Browder'iO desegregated
the bus system in Montgomery, Alabama, by affirming the court below
and citing Brown, Mayor, and Holmes.
All three opinions appeared in the rear section of U.S. Reports des-
ignated "Decisions Per Curiam," surrounded by summary decisions
dismissing cases for lack of a substantial federal question. The mes-
sage was unmistakable: attempts to preserve segregated public facili-
ties were, as a matter of law, so groundless and so lacking in merit
that they could be disposed of with a stroke, recorded among the cases
with the slightest claim on the Court's attention. Two years later,
when the Court struck down segregation in public housing, the per
curiam lacked even any cite to precedent; it consisted of just four
102. See id. at 162-63.
103. See id.
104. Toolson, 346 U.S. at 357.
105. For a more general study of indirection as an opinion writing strategy, see Laura
Krugman Ray, The Figure in the Judicial Carpet: Images of Family and State in
Supreme Court Opinions, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 331 (1987).
106. 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
107. Id. at 877.
108. 350 U.S. 879 (1955).
109. Id. at 879.
110. 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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words: "The judgment is affirmed."' The most elaborate of these per
curiams, Johnson v. Virginia,1 2 came in 1963, when the Court in two
pages reversed the contempt conviction of a black man who had re-
fused to sit in the blacks only section of traffic court. After describing
the facts of the case, the opinion disposed of the case with two
sentences:
Such a conviction cannot stand, for it is no longer open to question that a
State may not constitutionally require segregation of public facilities ...
State-compelled segregation in a court of justice is a manifest violation of the
State's duty to deny no one the equal protection of its laws. 1 13
In this sequence of cases the Court engaged in jurisprudence by
elision. Between Brown, which was carefully limited to public educa-
tion, and Johnson, which baldly asserted that the extension of Brown
to all public facilities "[was] no longer open to question,"'1 4 there is
quite simply no discussion by the Court of the implications of Brown
for any sphere outside education. Bernard Schwartz quotes the clerk
instructed by Warren to draft the Montgomery bus opinion by citing
three precedents as saying, "I thought at the time that it was a pretty
casual way for the Court to advance a major proposition of constitu-
tional law and still do."1n5 Perhaps "subtle" would be a better adjec-
tive than "casual." What the Court did instead of providing a detailed
legal rationale was to build a bridge of per curiams, each one
presented as following inevitably from its predecessor, until the final
conclusion was, as the Court insisted, irrefutable. The strategic ad-
vantages of this approach are obvious. It would hardly have assisted
the painful struggle to implement Brown throughout the South if each
new case provided a new occasion to revisit old discredited arguments
and reopen old wounds. By eliminating legal discussion and allowing
the per curiam form to carry its message of unstoppable progress, the
Court communicated its constitutional position more effectively and
less provocatively than a sequence of fully developed opinions could
have done."i 6
On at least one occasion the Court used the per curiam to conceal
its intention of ducking a particularly sensitive racial issue. The
Court confronted the appeal in Naim v. Naim,ii7 which challenged
the constitutionality of Virginia's anti-miscegenation law, at confer-
111. New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958).
112. 373 U.S. 61 (1963).
113. Id. at 62.
114. Id.
115. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 80, at 126.
116. Schwartz finds such criticisms irrelevant and asks, "Was there a need for expla-
nations once the Brown opinion - with the broad sweep of its language striking
down separation of the races - had been written?" Id. In my view, whatever need
for explanation remained was met by the implicit message conveyed by the use of
intervening per curiam opinions.
117. 350 U.S. 891 (1955).
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ence in November 1955, little more than five months after the issu-
ance of Brown II, the opinion mandating enforcement of the school
desegregation decision.118 At conference Justice Frankfurter insisted
that it would be a mistake to hear the case because a divided decision
on the miscegenation law would interfere with the difficult enforce-
ment process under Brown. Frankfurter argued "'that to throw a deci-
sion of this Court ... into the vortex of the present disquietude would
* . . seriously, I believe very seriously, embarrass the carrying-out of
the Court's decree of last May.'" 119 Over dissenting votes from War-
ren and Black, who believed that the Court should meet its responsi-
bility and address the issue, the Court voted to issue a per curiam
opinion based on the inadequacy of the record below.120 With Frank-
furter's assistance, Justice Clark drafted a deliberately vague opinion
citing "[tihe inadequacy of the record" and "the failure of the parties to
bring here all questions relevant to the disposition of the case" as the
reasons for the Court's decision remanding the case to the lower
court.121 Although both Warren and Black considered appending dis-
sents, eventually both decided to refrain, allowing the Court to use the
per curiam as a perfect instrument of evasion. 122
C. Creating New Law
By the late 1960s the Court had moved beyond evasion, using the
per curiam not only to avoid important substantive issues but also at
times forthrightly to resolve them. The most remarkable of the per
curiam cases in which the Court made significant new law is Branden-
burg v. Ohio,123 unmistakably a major First Amendment precedent.
Reviewing Ohio's criminal syndicalism statute, the Court replaced its
longstanding clear and present danger test for speech advocating ille-
gal action with a new, more liberal standard by striking down the stat-
ute for its failure to distinguish between speech that directly incites
"imminent lawless action" and speech that merely advocates it.124
The opinion also overruled Whitney v. California,125 a forty-year-old,
though "thoroughly discredited," precedent, and it is surprising to find
such a decisive step taken in a per curiam. 126
118. See SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 80, at 158-59. Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion (Brown I), 349 U.S. 294 (1955), appeared a year after Brown I, 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
119. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, supra note 80, at 159.
120. See id. at 160-61.
121. Id. at 160.
122. See id. at 160-61.
123. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
124. Id. at 447.
125. 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
126. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
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The explanation for Brandenburg is as remarkable as its use of the
per curiam form. After oral argument on February 27, 1969, the
Court voted unanimously to overturn the defendant's conviction for
statements made at a Ku Klux Klan rally in violation of the Ohio stat-
ute. 127 The case was assigned to Justice Fortas, who had his signed
draft in circulation by April 11th. Although by mid-April Fortas also
had the necessary votes, he agreed to a request from Justice Harlan
that he delay releasing Brandenburg until two related cases were also
ready because "'it would be well to bring down the three cases at the
same time."' 128 That delay was fatal to Fortas's authorship of Bran-
denburg. On May 14th he responded to pressure from Congress and
the White House over allegations of irregular financial dealings and
resigned from the Court.12 9 The case was then reassigned to Brennan
and reappeared as a per curiam.
The Brandenburg draft that Brennan inherited from Fortas was a
polished opinion of slightly more than seven pages, and Brennan left
much of the draft intact. He corrected a few technical errors, moved
part of one paragraph from the text to a footnote, made some minor
stylistic adjustments, and eliminated two pages of text, most of it an
historical account of the enactment and enforcement of criminal syndi-
calism statutes.130 Brennan also deleted Fortas's final paragraph,
which found "no need here to decide whether under a properly drawn
statute the State could punish any aspect of the conduct disclosed by
this record."13 1 The per curiam opinion is thus both shorter and more
narrowly focused than the Fortas draft.
In addition to making these routine changes, however, Brennan
also took one highly significant step. In the language of the Fortas
draft, the First Amendment would permit prosecution for speech that
advocates force or illegal action when that speech is "directed to incit-
ing or producing imminent lawless action and is attended by present
127. See Bernard Schwartz, Justice Brennan and the Brandenburg Decision-A Law-
giver in Action, 79 JuDIcATuRE 24, 27 (1995)[hereinafter Schwartz, Justice
Brennan].
128. Id. at 28 (quoting a letter from Justice Harlan to Justice Fortas).
129. For an account of the events leading up to the Fortas resignation, including his
acceptance of the controversial stipend from Louis Wolfson, a financier of dubious
reputation, see BRUCE ALAN MURPHY, FORTAS: THE RISE AND RUIN OF A SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE 545-77 (1988) and LAURA KALmAN, ABE FORTAS: A BIOGRAPHY 359-
78 (1990).
130. See Fortas Draft, Brandenburg v. Ohio, in THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, Manu-
script Division, Library of Congress (1969)[hereinafter Fortas Draft]. The histor-
ical section describes the statutes as targeting the Industrial Workers of the
World as a source of anarchist doctrine. See id. at 3-4. Brennan also removed
sentences describing the positions of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in Whitney v.
California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), and Chief Justice Vinson in Dennis v. United
States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951). See Fortas Draft at 5.
131. Fortas Draft, supra note 130, at 8.
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danger that such action may in fact be provoked."' 3 2 Fortas rejected a
request by Black that all references to the clear and present danger
test be eliminated, though Black was nonetheless willing to concur in
the draft.133 When Brennan took over the opinion he altered Fortas's
controlling language, removing the echo of the earlier test. In his
version,
the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a
State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action. 1 3 4
The opinion was released on June 9, 1969,135 less than a month after
Fortas's resignation from the Court on May 14th.136
Brennan's seemingly slight verbal adjustment of Fortas's language
in fact altered First Amendment doctrine dramatically.137 Where
Fortas's version of the traditional clear and present danger test still
allowed the government to restrict speech when there was any "pre-
sent danger" of imminent lawless action, Brennan's reformulation im-
posed tighter restraints on government: only when the speech at issue
was "likely to incite or produce such action" could the speaker be si-
lenced.' 38 Gerald Gunther has described Brandenburg as creating "a
new standard of speech protection."139 More sweepingly, Morton Hor-
witz has described it as "[tihe culmination of Justice Brennan's free-
speech jurisprudence," an opinion that "finally shook off the repressive
effects of McCarthyism, vindicated the Holmes-Brandeis free speech
dissents, and arguably even went beyond Justices Holmes and Bran-
deis in the protection it provided speech."'140
132. Id. at 5; Schwartz, Justice Brennan, supra note 127, at 27.
133. See MURPHY, supra note 129, at 543.
134. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447.
135. See id. at 444. The case was argued on February 27th.
136. See KALMAN, supra note 129, at 373.
137. Schwartz notes of Brennan's revision, "It is true that his redraft changed only a
small portion of what Justice Fortas had written, but the changes completely al-
tered the nature of the Brandenburg opinion, converting it from one that con-
firmed the clear and present danger test to one that virtually did away with the
test as the governing standard in First Amendment cases." Schwartz, Justice
Brennan, supra note 127, at 28.
138. For an analysis of the Fortas and Brennan opinions in the context of the tests
authored by Holmes and Learned Hand, see generally Schwartz, Justice Bren-
nan, supra note 127, and Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and
Present Danger or Advocacy of Unlawful Action?, Sup. CT. REv. 209, 236-41
(1994).
139. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 603 (1994). Shortly
after the opinion was issued, Gunther described Brandenburg as "the most
speech-protective standard yet evolved by the Supreme Court." Gerald Gunther,
Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doctrine: Some Frag-
ments of History, 27 STAN. L. REv. 719, 755 (1975).




Brandenburg is thus a landmark case released in per curiam form
only because of its unusual history. Most of the brief text was written
by Fortas and left intact by Brennan, so in one sense it was a collabo-
rative work by two members of the Court-one departed, one very
much present-rather than an authentic "Brennan" opinion. In a
larger sense, however, the opinion stretches the increasingly elastic
boundaries of the per curiam in two additional ways. First, by failing
to identify the true author of a new and influential standard, Bran-
denburg obscures the doctrinal development of First Amendment ju-
risprudence. Second, by signaling that the case is an unexceptional
resolution of a routine legal issue, the per curiam obscures as well the
significance of its content. Fortas had circulated Brandenburg as a
signed opinion, and it seems clear that had he remained on the Court,
or had Brennan been originally assigned the case, Brandenburg would
not have emerged as a per curiam. The twist of fate that allowed
Brennan to alter First Amendment law in a way that Fortas had re-
jected also allowed the per curiam to assume new prominence as a
source of important new law.
Following Brandenburg, the decade of the 1970s was the high-
water mark of the per curiam as a vehicle for the resolution of impor-
tant cases with new doctrinal content. A new element also entered the
mix at this point - the Court's increasing willingness to resolve cases
in per curiam form without the full trappings of the conventional re-
view process. Over the sustained complaints of Justices Marshall,
Stevens, and Blackmun, the Court acquired the habit of granting cer-
tiorari and reversing decisions below without either full briefing or
oral argument.1 41 Pennsylvania v. Mimms1 4 2 illustrates this phenom-
enon. The case presented a new Fourth Amendment issue, whether a
police officer who had stopped a car for a routine motor vehicle infrac-
tion, here an expired license plate, could order the driver to step out of
the car and, having then observed a bulge in the driver's jacket, frisk
the driver and arrest him for offenses based on the weapon found in
141. See ROBERT L. STERN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 250-54 (7th ed. 1993). For
other cases in which dissenters complained about the Court's summary use of the
per curiam, see, e.g., Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 387 (1982)(Brennan, J., dis-
senting)(deploring the use of summary disposition based on certiorari petitions
"to change or extend the law in significant respects"); California v. Mitchell Bros.
Santa Ana Theater, 454 U.S. 90, 95 (1981)(Stevens, J., dissenting)(terming it
"distressing to find that the Court considers novel questions of this character so
easy as not even to merit argument"); Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656, 662
(1973)(Douglas, J., dissenting)(accusing the Court of deciding sub silentio "a
question this Court studiously has avoided"). For a discussion of the Court's use
of the per curiam for summary dispositions, see Washy et al., supra note 8, at 37-
38.
142. 434 U.S. 106 (1977).
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the search.143 In its opinion of barely five pages, the Court carefully
separated the issue into two parts. The first, which it characterized as
"the narrow question" of the reasonableness of the order to vacate the
car,144 was resolved by balancing the police officer's safety interest
against what the Court termed the "de minimis" intrusion on the
driver's liberty interest and finding that the officer's interest pre-
vailed.145 The second, the propriety of the search itself, was found to
be clearly governed by precedent. "We have," the Court noted, "as lit-
tle doubt on this point as on the first."146 This note of certitude con-
nects the resolution of the two questions, one new law and one based
on precedent, and deems them equally suited to the per curiam form.
Both dissenters, Marshall and Stevens, took exception to the man-
ner of the Court's decision as well as to its content. In a solitary opin-
ion, Marshall objected to the resolution of "such an important issue"
based only on the parties' certiorari filings and argued "that the Court
does institutional as well as doctrinal damage by the course it pursues
today."' 47 Stevens's dissent, joined by Brennan and Marshall, was
even more pointed. He found it "disturbing" that "this important inno-
vation is announced almost casually"'148 and deplored what he termed
"the summary disposition of a novel constitutional question" by a
method that creates "an unacceptable risk of error."149 By forgoing its
standard practice of full briefing and oral argument, the Court, in the
dissenters' view, assumes a degree of expertise it lacks and fails to
give the parties their deserved opportunity to present the merits of
their case. Worse still to Stevens is the Court's refusal to acknowledge
the significant step it is taking, its pretense that only narrow and ob-
vious questions of law are being resolved.5o
143. The driver was convicted of carrying a concealed deadly weapon and unlawfully
carrying a firearm without a license. See id. at 107.
144. Id. at 109.
145. Id. at 111.
146. Id. The controlling precedent was Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
147. Mimms, 434 U.S. at 114-15 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
148. Id. at 116 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
149. Id. at 124.
150. For another case in which the dissent accuses the Court of deciding an important
constitutional issue sub silentio, see Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973). In
Ortwein, the Court ruled that Oregon's twenty-five dollar appellate court filing
fee did not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses as applied to the
appellants' efforts to appeal reductions of their welfare benefits. The Court relied
on its ruling in United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973), where it had upheld
bankruptcy filing fees against a similar constitutional challenge. Dissenting in
Ortwein, Justice Marshall attacked both the substantive result and the summary
nature of the Court's disposition of the constitutional issue:
The extent to which the State may commit to administrative agencies
the unreviewable authority to restrict pre-existing rights is one of the
great questions of constitutional law about which courts and commenta-
tors have debated for generations.... Because I am not ready to decide
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Stevens's allusion to the casual quality of the Court's opinion
points to the strategic value of the per curiam in the announcement of
new law. The label itself, of course, immediately classifies the case as
routine and unexceptional. It also calls attention to a degree of con-
sensus that the decision may not justify, especially when there are
multiple or strongly worded separate opinions attached. More subtly,
the fact that the majority opinion does not carry an author's signature
or the names of those who join suggests that the named dissenters or
concurrers are a splinter group, renegades from an harmonious Court
rather than one bloc rejecting the position of another. The per curiam
label gives the opinion an unearned aura of inevitability that may
strengthen the majority's position against the counterarguments
raised by the dissent. Unlike a signed opinion, which personalizes in-
ternal disagreement, a per curiam throws the institutional weight of
the Court against the individually named Justices who oppose it.
The Court took advantage of the per curiam's aura of inevitability
in cases where it asserted that the application of settled doctrine
clearly mandated a particular result. In Stone v. Graham,151 for ex-
ample, the Court summarily ruled that a Kentucky statute requiring
the posting of the Ten Commandments in classrooms clearly had no
secular purpose and thus violated the test of Lemon v. Kurtzman.'5 2
Four Justices disagreed with the Court's sense of inevitability. Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Stewart all believed that
the case warranted full briefing and argument. 5 3 The fourth dis-
senter, Justice Rehnquist, called the Court's action "a cavalier sum-
mary reversal" and contributed a substantive opinion of his own.' 5 4
In spite of its summary resolution and its four dissenters, Stone set an
important precedent and is frequently cited, a per curiam that carries
significant weight despite its lack of a fully articulated rationale for its
result.155
that question summarily, sub silentio, and without the benefit of full
briefing and oral argument, I must dissent from the Court's decision.
410 U.S. at 666 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The other three dissenters, Stewart,
Douglas, and Brennan, all raised similar objections to the summary disposition,
but both Stewart and Brennan found, in Brennan's words, "no reason to set this
case for argument in light of the majority's firmly held view that Kras is control-
ling." Id. at 664 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
151. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
152. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
153. See Stone, 449 U.S. at 43.
154. Id. at 47 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
155. For other frequently cited cases in which the Court resolved constitutional issues
without plenary review, see, e.g., Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973)(holding
that appellate court filing fee does not violate due process or equal protection);
Papish v. Board of Curators of the Univ. of Missouri, 410 U.S. 667 (1973)(holding
application of "conventions of decency" on state university campus a violation of
First Amendment rights). Four Justices dissented in Ortwein; Stewart filed a
statement, and Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall filed dissenting opinions. See
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The Court appeared to make a similar use of the per curiam in
Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,15 6 where it determined
after argument that a Massachusetts statute mandating retirement
for all police officers at the age of fifty met the reasonableness stan-
dard of equal protection analysis.157 As Mark Tushnet has demon-
strated, however, Murgia reflects a more complicated resolution of a
highly divisive case and a more complicated use of the per curiam.158
The opinion in Murgia was originally assigned to Justice Brennan,
whose first draft reformulated the Court's rational review standard
and immediately provoked strong opposition from Justice Rehn-
quist.15 9 As the Justices exchanged correspondence and opinions
making clear their substantial differences, Justice Powell entered the
fray with an opinion based on a new theory.160 Brennan adopted Pow-
ell's opinion in an attempt to win support from other Justices, but
when that attempt failed he turned the case over to Powell, who then
revised his draft in order "'to attain as much unanimity as possi-
ble.'" 16 1 Rehnquist continued to resist Powell's approach, however,
and Powell once again revised to produce an opinion, in his words,
"'about as blandly written as one can write.'"16 2 The bland per curiam
skirted the crucial issue of the appropriate rational review standard,
Ortwein, 410 U.S. at 661 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 664 (Brennan, J., dis-
senting); id. at 665 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Papish, three Justices dis-
sented. Chief Justice Burger wrote a dissent and together with Justice
Blackmun joined Justice Rehnquist's dissent. See Papish, 410 U.S. at 671, 673.
156. 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
157. See id. at 316. Justice Marshall filed a lengthy dissenting opinion. See id. at 317
(Marshall, J., dissenting).
158. See Mark Tushnet, Justice Lewis F. Powell and the Jurisprudence of Centrism, 93
MICH. L. REV. 1854 (1995). Tushnet draws on the Thurgood Marshall Papers in
the Library of Congress, including memoranda and letters circulated among the
Justices during the consideration of the case, to reconstruct the events leading up
to the Murgia per curiam. See id.
159. See id. at 1856-57.
160. Brennan supported a more flexible standard that would give the Court more lee-
way in striking down state statutes, while Rehnquist believed that the standard
"'ought to virtually foreclose judicial invalidation except in the rare, rare case
where the legislature has all but run amok and acted in a patently arbitrary
manner.'" Id. (quoting Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Wil-
liam J. Brennan 1 (Jan. 30, 1976), in THuRGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, Library of
Congress, box 165, file 8). Powell's new approach was based on a theory that the
class of older adults affected by the statute had sufficient political power to pro-
tect its interests in the legislature. See id. at 1858.
161. Id. at 1859 (quoting Memorandum from Justice Powell to the Conference (May
19, 1976), in THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, Library of Congress, box 165, file 8).
162. Id. at 1860 (quoting Memorandum from Justice Lewis F. Powell, Sr. to the Con-
ference (June 15, 1976), in THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS, Library of Congress,
box 165, file 8). Rehnquist had asked Powell to include "a quotation of Rehn-
quist's preferred standard," but Powell "apparently was uncomfortable with writ-
ing an opinion that, in both his and Rehnquist's eyes, was internally
inconsistent." Tushnet, supra note 158, at 1860.
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describing it simply as "relatively relaxed,"16 3 and won the votes of all
the participating Justices except for Marshall, the lone dissenter.i 6 4
Murgia, a frequently cited precedent, achieved consensus only by de-
clining to engage the crucial issue that divided the Court. It made
law, if only of the blandest nature, leaving the Justices, again in Pow-
ell's words to his colleagues, "'free to fight again another day.'"1 6 5
D. Using Procedure as a Screen
During this same period the Court employed the per curiam to re-
solve or, as the dissenters might argue, manipulate a procedural issue
in order to avoid confronting a difficult substantive issue. Perhaps the
most noted of such cases was DeFunis v. Odegaard,i 66 where, over
impatient dissents from Justices Douglas and Brennan,1 67 the Court
found an affirmative action case brought by a law student then in his
last semester to be moot. Brennan, writing for four Justices, accused
the Court of "straining to rid itself of this dispute" in order to defer its
first engagement with affirmative action issues in the school con-
text.1 68 The majority's selection of the per curiam form once again
signaled that this was a routine instance of an issue that had been
overtaken by circumstances and rendered unsuitable for resolution on
the merits, in sharp contrast to the dissents' insistence on the signifi-
cance of the issue and its claim to the Court's full attention.
In a second case, Snepp v. United States,169 the dissent suggested
that the Court's per curiam was using a novel procedural route to
reach its desired substantive result. The case involved the obligation
of a Central Intelligence Agency employee to secure prepublication
clearance for his book, and Justice Stevens in dissent objected that the
Court's sub silentio granting of the government's conditional cross-pe-
tition for certiorari was "as unprecedented as its disposition of the
merits" by the imposition of a constructive trust on Snepp's earnings
from the book.170 Whatever the majority's intent, the use of the per
163. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 314.
164. See id. at 317 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens did not participate. See
id.
165. Tushnet, supra note 158, at 1860-61 (quoting Memorandum from Justice Lewis
F. Powell, Sr. to Conference (June 15, 1976), in THURGOOD MARSHALL PAPERS,
Library of Congress, box 165, file 8).
166. 416 U.S. 312 (1974).
167. See id. at 320 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 348 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Douglas's lengthy dissent addressed the merits of the case. Brennan's brief dis-
sent, joined by Douglas, White, and Marshall, argued that the case was not moot
and that the Court's evasion of the substantive issue "clearly disserves the public
interest." Id. at 350.
168. Id. at 349 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
169. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
170. Id. at 524 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see STERN ET AL., supra note 141, at 253-54.
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curiamn suggested that nothing new or unusual was involved in resolv-
ing the case.
On occasion dissenters have directly accused the Court of issuing
procedural rulings in per curiam opinions as a smokescreen for signifi-
cant but unstated substantive messages. When the Court in Patterson
v. McLean Credit Union17l ordered reargument on the question of
whether a recent civil rights precedent, Runyon v. McCrary,17 2 should
be reconsidered, the dissenters detected hostility to the holding of
Runyon and reacted strongly. Writing again in dissent, Justice Ste-
vens rebuked the Court for its procedural and substantive
overreaching:
If the Court decides to cast itself adrift from the constraints imposed by the
adversary process and to fashion its own agenda, the consequences for the
Nation-and for the future of this Court as an institution-will be even more
serious than any temporary encouragement of previously rejected forms of ra-
cial discrimination. The Court has inflicted a serious-and unwise-wound
upon itself today.17
3
The text of the Court's opinion is highly unusual in its direct rejoinder
to the dissenters' charges; it is almost entirely devoted to a defense of
the reargument order, buttressed by long lists of precedents for both
requesting reargument and overruling precedent. 174 The usually
bland per curiam became, in this case, a battleground for a heavily
divided Court, with four Justices attacking the motives and the strat-
egy of their five prevailing colleagues in seeking to revisit Runyon
under cover of an unsigned per curiam order.
E. Disciplining Courts and Litigants
In the same period, the Court also used the per curiam as a disci-
plinary tool to chastise both litigants and lower courts. The per
curiam for In re Sindram175 denied the petitioner's motion to proceed
in forma pauperis on the basis of his excessive filings and ordered the
Court clerk to accept Sindram's future petitions for extraordinary
writs only if accompanied by the requisite fee. 176 The three dissenters
faulted the Court for both procedural and substantive errors: "the to-
tal absence of any authority for the penalty" 17 7 and the "unseemly
171. 485 U.S. 617 (1988).
172. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
173. Patterson, 485 U.S. at 623 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan, Marshall,
and Blackmun joined in the Stevens dissent. See id.at 621. Justice Blackmun
wrote a separate dissent joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens. See
id. at 619.
174. See id. at 618.
175. 498 U.S. 177 (1991).
176. See id. at 180.
177. Id. at 181 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Blackmun and Stevens joined Mar-
shall's dissent. See id. Blackmun wrote a separate dissent, joined by Marshall.
See id. at 182.
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message of hostility to indigent litigants."178 As in Patterson, the dis-
senters detected a hidden agenda behind the bland surface of a per
curiam that claimed neutral and evenhanded intentions.
Even the per curiam's early function as an efficient means of invok-
ing precedent was sharpened by the 1980s into a pointed means of
scolding lower courts. Thus, in Hutto v. Davis,179 the Court noted that
a court of appeals that had disregarded precedent "could be viewed as
having ignored, consciously or unconsciously, the hierarchy of the fed-
eral court system created by the Constitution and Congress."1so In
such cases, the per curiam became a useful tool for the Court, acting in
its administrative role as supervisor of its own internal workings and
of the entire federal court system, to issue stern rebukes with the im-
personal authority of an unsigned opinion. Perhaps the clearest exam-
ple of the per curiam employed to recall a straying lower federal court
to its duty occurred in Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Educa-
tion,'8 ' where the Court characterized the issue before it, a desegrega-
tion order for Mississippi schools, as "one of paramount
importance."i 8 2 It then proceeded to reverse the court of appeals,
which had granted extensions of time for compliance by school dis-
tricts.i83 The Court's opinion contained a five-part order giving the
court of appeals explicit directions for handling the case on remand,
and there was no dissent.' 8 4 In Alexander the Court used the per
curiam as it had earlier used unanimity in Brown and the signature of
all nine Justices in Cooper v. Aaron,'8 5 to summon its full institu-
tional power. Here, at least, the per curiam retained much of its early
vigor as an expression of a unified and determined Court.
V. THE PER CURIAM AND INDIVIDUAL EXPRESSION
These various strategic uses of the per curiam suggest its great
flexibility as a decisionmaking instrument and the Court's ingenuity
in adapting that instrument to new occasions. In the 1970s, faced
with three cases of extraordinary importance, the Court took advan-
tage of the malleable per curiam to address particularly difficult con-
stitutional issues: the propriety under the First Amendment of
restraining publication of the Pentagon Papers in New York Times Co.
178. Id. at 182 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
179. 454 U.S. 370 (1982).
180. Id. at 374-75; see also Florida v. Meyers, 466 U.S. 380, 382 (1984)(noting that
"[tihe District Court of Appeal either misunderstood or ignored our prior
rulings").
181. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
182. Id. at 20.
183. See id.
184. See id. at 20-21.
185. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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v. United States,'86 the constitutionality of the death penalty in
Furman v. Georgia,18 7 and the constitutionality of campaign finance
legislation in Buckley v. Valeo.'8 8 The Court's technique ranges from
the barest of per curiam opinions to the densest, from detailed sepa-
rate opinions to more broadly conceived commentaries. In all three
cases, however, the per curiam allows the Court to accommodate the
opposing values of institutional consensus and individual expression.
A. The Minimalist Opinion and Efficiency: New York Times
Co. v. United States
New York Times Co. v. United States came to the Court under con-
ditions of great urgency and high drama.18 9 The United States, claim-
ing imminent harm to its security interests and personnel, was
seeking to enjoin the New York Times and the Washington Post from
publishing portions of the forty-seven volume top secret study of
American policy in Vietnam known as the Pentagon Papers. The
lower courts hearing the cases had both issued temporary restraining
orders, and on Friday, June 25, 1971, the Justices (minus Justice
Douglas, already at his vacation home in Goose Prairie, Washington,
but in telephone communication with the Court) met to decide
whether to hear the cases. 190 Four Justices-Black, Douglas, Bren-
nan, and Marshall-wanted to deny certiorari and dissolve the re-
straining orders at once. Four other Justices-the Chief Justice,
joined by Harlan, White, and Blackmun-wanted to hear the cases
but to delay argument.19' The controlling vote belonged to Justice
Stewart, who wanted to keep the stay in place but hear the cases the
following morning.19 2 With certiorari granted, the records for both
cases were provided to the Court that day, although the materials
from the New York Times case did not arrive until eight o'clock in the
evening.193 The two-hour oral argument began fifteen hours later, at
eleven o'clock Saturday morning, and the Court met once again in con-
ference that afternoon, issuing its decision just four days later. The
186. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
187. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
188. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
189. For a thorough account of the events surrounding the case, see SANFORD J. UN-
GAP, THE PAPERS & THE PAPERS (1972). The Brethren describes the handling of
the case by the Justices. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 84, at 139-150.
190. See WOODWARD & AmiSTmONG, supra note 84, at 141.
191. Sources differ on the details of the Burger bloc's position. According to Bernard
Schwartz, these Justices "wanted the cases set for argument the following week."
BERNARD SCHwARTZ, THE ASCENT OF PRAGMATISMa 160 (1990). Woodward and
Armstrong assert that the Burger bloc "wanted to hear argument in October and
continue the injunction until then." WOODWARD & AiiSTRONG, supra note 84, at
141.




Court was able to complete this remarkably rapid resolution by the
simple expedient of severing the result in the case from its rationale.
As Chief Justice Burger later remarked in discussing the case, "'[t]he
simplest thing to do in getting it out in a hurry is each justice states
what is on his mind.'"194 The lean per curiam allowed the Court to
resolve the case swiftly, dissolving the prior restraints placed on the
newspapers, without taking the time that would surely have been nec-
essary to fashion a majority opinion satisfactory to five members of
the highly divided Court.
The Court's brief three paragraph per curiam, written by Justice
Brennan on Saturday morning before oral argument and eventually
supported by six Justices, said almost nothing of substance.1 9 5 The
first paragraph described the issue, and the third entered the Court's
mandate. In the only paragraph to invoke the merits, the Court
quoted from two unexceptionable precedents, one holding that a re-
quest for a prior restraint "'comes to this Court bearing a heavy pre-
sumption against its constitutional validity'"1 9 6 and the second
asserting that the government "'thus carries a heavy burden of show-
ing justification for the imposition of such a restraint.'" 97 After
briefly referring to three lower court rulings that the government had
failed to meet its burden, the Court tersely noted, "We agree."1 9 8
There was no other statement of law and no application of the law to
the facts of the case; the Court's agreement was distilled to those two
words endorsing the unexplained holdings of lower courts. The per
curiam thus became a form of minimalist jurisprudence, a device al-
lowing the Court to achieve its result with the most limited basis for
consensus.1 99
The six concurring opinions written by Justices Black, Douglas,
Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall illustrate vividly why the
Court's per curiam was crafted in this way. Some of the Justices
paired off-Black and Douglas joined each other's opinions, as did
Stewart and White; the other two wrote alone. And each Justice had a
particular slant on the case. Black, predictably, believed that the
First Amendment prohibited any restraint on the press that, by dis-
194. UNGAR, supra note 189, at 242. Despite his own dissenting opinion, Burger an-
nounced the Court's decision from the bench on June 30th. See id.
195. See SCHWARTZ, ASCENT OF PRAGMATISM, supra note 191, at 160. According to
Schwartz, "As soon as Brennan arrived at the Court the next morning (Saturday,
June 26), he drafted a brief per curiam affirming the lower court in the Post case
and reversing it in the Times case." Id.
196. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 714 (quoting Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372
U.S. 58, 70 (1963)).
197. Id. (quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971)).
198. Id.
199. For a study of the Rehnquist Court's minimalist approach, see CASS SUNSTEIN,
ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
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closing government conduct, "fiilfill[edl its essential role in our democ-
racy."200 His opinion included a paraphrase of a southern drinking
song to emphasize the role of the press in preventing government from
sending the people "off to distant lands to die of foreign fevers and
foreign shot and shell."201 Douglas, Black's usual companion in First
Amendment cases, joined that opinion but wrote separately to include
a discussion of inapplicable statutory authority and the absence of in-
herent government power to restrain the press. 20 2 Brennan wrote
separately to caution that this case should not be read "to indicate the
propriety, in the future, of issuing temporary stays and restraining
orders to block the publication of material sought to be suppressed by
the Government"20 3 and to insist that only the most exigent circum-
stances would justify such restraint.20 4 Stewart took a dramatically
different approach in his concurrence, emphasizing the executive
branch's constitutional duty "as a matter of sovereign prerogative and
not as a matter of law as the courts know law" to protect confidential-
ity in international matters.20 5 He nonetheless joined the Court's
judgment because he found that disclosure of the Pentagon Papers
would not "surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage
to our Nation or its people."2o6 For White, on the other hand, it was
clear that disclosure of some of the documents would result in harm to
the nation.20 7 He nonetheless joined his five colleagues because the
government had not met its burden "in the absence of express and
appropriately limited congressional authorization for prior restraints
in circumstances such as these."2o8 Finally, Marshall, like White, ad-
dressed the statutory aspect of the case, although Marshall character-
ized the issue differently, as "whether this Court or the Congress has
the power to make law" concerning press restraints. 20 9 Since Con-
gress had failed to legislate, the Court lacked the power to "enact[ ]
law, especially a law that Congress has refused to pass," in order to
prevent publication. 2 o
The breadth of disagreement in these concurrences is astonish-
ing.2 11 The Justices disagreed about the likelihood of harm from pub-
lication of the Pentagon Papers, about the role of the Court in
200. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 717 (Black, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 717.
202. See id. at 720-22 (Douglas, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 724-25 (Brennan, J., concurring).
204. See id. at 726-27.
205. 403 U.S. at 729-30 (Stewart, J., concurring).
206. Id. at 730.
207. See id. at 731 (White, J., concurring).
208. Id.
209. Id. at 741 (Marshall, J., concurring).
210. Id. at 747.
211. Although White joined the majority after learning, during conference, that yet
another newspaper had obtained access to the Pentagon Papers, the three other
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enforcing the First Amendment, about the branch of government with
authority to protect the confidentiality of sensitive material. The
Court's per curiam provided the only basis for consensus with its
spare statement of agreement that the government had failed to meet
its burden of persuasion on the question of prior restraint. New York
Times is unlike Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,212 another
critical constitutional case reviewed by the Court in circumstances of
haste and public scrutiny, where the four Justices in the majority
could accept a brief doctrinal opinion by Justice Black before going off
on their own to add their separate concurrences which refined and, in
some instances, contradicted Black. With so little common ground,
the majority Justices in New York Times found in the per curiam a
convenient form to contain the message of their diverse concurrences:
we stand together as a Court and emphatically reject the govern-
ment's claim for prior restraint of the press on these facts; although
our individual positions vary significantly, and we encourage you to
read them, the urgent nature of this case makes the result more im-
portant than the theory that supports it.
In a curious way, the minimalist per curiam necessitated by the
broad disagreement within the Court tempted the Chief Justice, him-
self one of the three dissenters, to read the opinion from the bench and
to tell the ABA convention the following week that New York Times v.
United States was "actually unanimous."2 13 A common theme of the
three dissenters is what Burger terms the Court's "unseemly haste" in
resolving the case without adequate time for briefing or preparation,
suggesting a procedural rather than substantive divergence. 2 14 Bur-
ger's opinion notes as well that "[t]he prompt setting of these cases
reflects our universal abhorrence of prior restraint," a sentence that
may have allowed him to make his comment about unanimity with a
straight face. 215 The other dissenters, however, both indicated less
concern over the First Amendment rights of the press. Harlan's opin-
ion circumscribed the judicial role to a threshold determination of
whether the disclosure at issue was within the executive branch's au-
thority over foreign relations; if so, "the judiciary may not properly...
redetermine for itself the probable impact of disclosure on the national
security."2 6 Blackmun, too, expressed no distaste for prior restraints,
observing that the "First Amendment, after all, is only one part of an
entire Constitution" and that "there are situations where restraint is
members of the Burger bloc wrote separate dissents. See ScuVARTz, ASCENT OF
PRAGMATISM, supra note 191, at 160-61.
212. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
213. WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 84, at 150.
214. New York Times, 403 U.S. at 748 (Burger, J., dissenting).
215. Id. at 748-49.
216. Id. at 757 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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in order and is constitutional."21 7 Although it seems clear that Burger
was overreaching in describing the Court's position as unanimous, the
minimalist per curiam provided a pretext for claiming wider consen-
sus than the diverse separate opinions-concurring as well as dissent-
ing-would seem to warrant.
B. The Minimalist Opinion and Personal Liberation:
Furman v. Georgia
The per curiam performed a similar function in a case which
lacked the extraordinary time pressure of New York Times but which
carried an urgency and solemnity of its own. In Furman v. Georgia,218
decided almost precisely a year after New York Times,219 the Court
reviewed several death sentences under the Georgia and Texas death
penalty statutes and found them to be unconstitutional. 220 The one
paragraph per curiam relays the Court's holding in a single lean sen-
tence: "The Court holds that the imposition and carrying out of the
death penalty in these cases constitute cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 221 The per
curiam is followed by five separate concurrences authored by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall, all veterans of the
New York Times majority. The authors of the four dissenting opinions
included the two new Justices, Powell and Rehnquist, who replaced
Justices Black and Harlan early in 1972.222 With New York Times as
a model, the majority Justices were freed by the per curiam to write
concurrences which at times approach highly personalized essays.
The Furman concurrences reflect the central beliefs of each concur-
ring author. For Douglas, the Georgia statutes are "pregnant with
discrimination"223 against the poor, the politically powerless, and the
members of disfavored minorities. 2 24 In a characteristic reference, he
cites to a Hindu law which increased the punishment "'as social status
diminished'" and laments that "[we have, I fear, taken in practice the
same position."225 Just as Douglas returns to his enduring theme of
protection for the disadvantaged outsider, Brennan relies on a central
217. Id. at 761 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
218. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
219. New York Times was decided on June 30, 1971. Furman was decided on June 29,
1972, five months after oral argument.
220. The Court entered "similar orders" in 120 other pending death penalty cases.
MICHAEL MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNusuAL: THE SuPREr~m COURT AND CAPITAL
PuNismiENT 292 (1973).
221. Furman, 408 U.S. at 239-40.
222. See id. at 240. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun authored the other
two dissenting opinions. See id.
223. Id. at 257 (Douglas, J., concurring).




tenet of his jurisprudence, the essential dignity of each human being.
Since "it]he State, even as it punishes, must treat its members with
respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings,"2 26 the death pen-
alty is an unconstitutional "denial of the executed person's human-
ity."227 For Stewart, the central failing of the death sentences at issue
is their arbitrariness. Tracking the language of the Eighth Amend-
ment, he finds that "[tihese death sentences are cruel and unusual in
the same way that being struck by lightning is cruel and unusual."22s
The approach is typical of Stewart, tying a practical observation to the
textual language of the relevant constitutional provision. White's con-
currence characteristically relies on what he terms "common sense
and experience."2 29 Since legislatures have delegated the sentencing
function to juries, which in the valid exercise of their discretion fre-
quently choose a less harsh punishment than death, "capital punish-
ment within the confines of the statutes now before us has for all
practical purposes run its course."2 30 Marshall's concurrence is a
lengthy examination of the asserted functions of the death penalty,
complete with three appendices of data. His systematic refutation of
each function is less striking than the framework that contains it. He
opens by noting that "[c]andor compels me to confess that I am not
oblivious to the fact that this is truly a matter of life and death"2 3 ' and
closes by noting that in striking down the death penalty the Court
pays homage to the basic decency and humanity of "our system of gov-
ernment."23 2 The various arguments and data Marshall presents are
subsumed by the simple frame, reminiscent of Brennan's opinion,
which locates the death penalty in a larger moral context.
The five concurrences in Furman illustrate the liberating effect of
the per curiam for the Justices who supported it: the concurrences are
vivid, distinctive, and occasionally idiosyncratic. Writing on an issue
that extends beyond the usual parameters of the legal system, the
Justices invoke without apology ethics, experience, and emotion in ar-
ticulating their responses. This mood of personal liberation extends to
the dissenters as well, especially to Justice Blackmun who, early in
his career on the Court, joins his fellow dissenters but adds what he
terms "the following, somewhat personal comments," which are indeed
personal. 233 He opens by observing that such cases "provide for me an
excruciating agony of the spirit,"234 a remarkably intimate confession,
226. 408 U.S. at 270 (Brennan, J., concurring).
227. Id. at 290.
228. Id. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
229. Id. at 312 (White, J., concurring).
230. Id. at 313.
231. 408 U.S. at 316 (Marshall, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 371.
233. Id. at 405 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
234. Id.
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and ends by expressing his ambivalence over his place in the dissent:
"Although personally I may rejoice at the Court's result, I find it diffi-
cult to accept or to justify as a matter of history, of law, or of constitu-
tional pronouncement." 23 5 The three other dissenters criticize
precisely this quality of openness in the concurring opinions. Chief
Justice Burger insists that "[olur constitutional inquiry, however,
must be divorced from personal feelings as to the morality and efficacy
of the death penalty."23 6 Justice Powell cautions, "those of us who sit
on this Court at a particular time should act with restraint before as-
suming, contrary to a century of precedent, that we now know the an-
swer for all time to come."23 7 More waspishly, Justice Rehnquist calls
the decision "not an act of judgment, but rather an act of will."238
Each of these responses, like the opinions of the concurring Justices,
seems perfectly characteristic of its author. Reading the full range of
nine opinions, it is hard not to believe that the neutrality of the per
curiam has encouraged its opposite, a set of remarkably open and per-
sonal responses to the constitutional challenge posed by the death
penalty.
C. Collaboration and the Broader Vision: Buckley v. Valeo
The third case in this trilogy, Buckley v. Valeo,2 39 holds the distinc-
tion of being without question-and without any serious competi-
tion-the longest per curiam ever written, an astonishing 138 pages,
followed by a ninety page appendix. Buckley was decided three and a
half years after Furman by a Court that differed only by Douglas's
departure and his replacement by Stevens, who did not participate in
the case.240 Although in personnel the Court remained almost identi-
cal, its approach differed dramatically from that used in New York
Times and Furman - a minimalist per curiam followed by each Jus-
tice's distinctive and painstakingly complete opinion. In Buckley, the
Court authorized what Bernard Schwartz has aptly called an "opinion
by committee,"24 1 a joint enterprise that produced a per curiam con-
235. Id. at 414.
236. Id. at 375 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
237. 408 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., dissenting).
238. Id. at 468 (Rebnquist, J., dissenting).
239. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
240. Buckley was argued on November 10, 1975 and decided on January 30, 1976.
Douglas had resigned from the Court two days after oral argument. Justice Ste-
vens, appointed by President Ford on November 28th, took the oath of office on
December 17th, too late to participate in Buckley.
241. ScHwARTZ, DECISION, supra note 84, at 142. Schwartz borrowed the term from an
unidentified Justice who, in conversation with him, had described United States
v. Nixon as "opinion by committee." BERNARD SciwARTz, THE UNPUBLISHED
OpmouNs OF THE BURGER COURT 276 (1988). Schwartz elsewhere quotes from a
memorandum to the Conference by then Justice Rehnquist describing the Buck-
ley process as "the farming out to several different members of the Court of differ-
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taining an elaborately detailed analysis of the campaign finance stat-
ute at issue. The separate opinions that followed-only five, totaling
what seems in context a paltry fifty-nine pages-make no attempt to
revisit the per curiam's detailed analysis and provide instead distinc-
tive perspectives on the general problem of regulating political cam-
paigns in a democratic system.
Buckley's challenge to the 1974 amendments to the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act not only raised a number of difficult First Amend-
ment issues concerning campaign finance, including public funding for
presidential candidates, but also raised a practical issue of timing.
The case was argued before the Court on November 10, 1975, and the
first release of funds for the 1976 presidential election was scheduled
for January 2, 1976.242 Although many opinions can be drafted, circu-
lated, and approved in less than two months without difficulty, the
complexities of this case and the disagreements among the Justices
that surfaced at conference indicated that Buckley was not likely to be
among them.2 43 To expedite the process, Justice Stewart proposed a
novel solution, the creation of a committee of Justices charged with
producing a per curiam opinion.244 The designated committee mem-
bers, Justices Stewart, Brennan, and Powell, parceled out sections of
the opinion to their colleagues, 2 45 and the resulting collaborative ef-
fort was then reviewed by a second committee, this time of law clerks,
with instructions, according to Justice Powell, "to harmonize stylistic
and verbiage differences between the several Parts subject, of course,
to review by each of us." 24 6 The per curiam form was thus adapted to
a new use: an anonymous screen for a jointly authored opinion that
could be prepared in time to meet an external deadline.
Both committees performed their tasks capably. The opinion is an
exhaustive treatment of the constitutionality of the 1974 FECA
amendments, written in a homogenized and impersonal judicial style
that defeats any attempt to determine the authors of the various sec-
ent portions of the opinion to write." Bernard Schwartz, Curiouser and
Curiouser: The Supreme Court's Separation of Powers Wonderland, 65 NORmE
DAME L. REV. 587, 596 (1990)(quoting Memorandum from Justice Rehnquist to
the Conference, December 10, 1979, at 7).
242. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 84, at 396; see also NELSON W. POLSBY
& AARON WILDAVSKY, PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 57 (4th ed. 1976).
243. See SCHWARTZ, DECISION, supra note 84, at 143.
244. See id.
245. See id. According to Woodward and Armstrong, Justice White was originally a
member of the committee but withdrew after he disagreed with the other mem-
bers over statutory caps on campaign expenditures and was replaced by Justice
Brennan. See WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 84, at 396.
246. SCHWARTZ, DECISION, supra note 84, at 143 (quoting a January 19, 1976 letter
from Justice Powell).
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tions.2 47 If the length of the per curiam discouraged the Justices from
revisiting the issues in detail, its impersonality encouraged four of
them to append their own personalized approaches to the broader is-
sue of federal regulation of campaign finance. All five separate opin-
ions concur in part and dissent in part; one, Justice Blackmun's, is a
scant three paragraphs noting the sections he joins and those he re-
jects.24 8 For the other separate authors, their opinions are the occa-
sion to stake out more distinctive positions.
Chief Justice Burger's opinion takes aim less at the Court's opinion
than at Congress and what he calls "an impermissible intrusion by the
Government into the traditionally private political process."2 49 The
opinion, unlike the section of the per curiam apparently written by
Burger, is filled with colorful language.2 50 Thus, "Congress has used a
shotgun to kill wrens as well as hawks,"251 the intermingling of gov-
ernment and politics is potentially "incestuous,"2 52 and the Court's
"effort to blend First Amendment principles and practical politics has
produced a strange offspring."2 53 In his view Congress' entire cam-
paign finance enterprise is misguided, and so are the Court's efforts to
distinguish valid from invalid regulations. The opinion ends with a
pithy, if inelegant, restatement of its theme: "Freedom is hazardous,
but some restraints are worse."2 54 The language, unusually vivid for
Burger, reflects his strong sense that the Court has gone fundamen-
tally astray in its endorsement of even part of Congress' overreaching.
Although the dominant theme of Justice White's opinion contrasts
sharply with Burger's hands-off approach, White matches Burger in
the scope and intensity of his disapproval. White writes as the prag-
matist, surprised and irritated that the Court is "strangely enough
claiming more insight as to what may improperly influence candi-
dates" than those "seasoned professionals," the members of Congress
and the President, who passed and signed the statute.2 55 White of
247. The anonymity of the committee's opinion has apparently been pierced by insider
information. According to Woodward and Armstrong, Stewart wrote the sections
on campaign contributions and expenditures, Powell wrote the sections on disclo-
sure and reporting requirements, Brennan wrote the section on public financing
of presidential elections, Rehnquist wrote the section on the Federal Election
Commission, and Burger wrote the preamble and the statement of facts. See
WOODWARD & ARMISTRONG, supra note 84, at 396; see also ScMvARTz, ASCENT OF
PRAGMATISM, supra note 191, at 89, 144.
248. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 290 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
249. Id. at 235 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
250. See supra note 247.
251. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 239 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
252. Id. at 249.
253. Id. at 253.
254. Id. at 257.
255. Id. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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course was actively involved in President Kennedy's election cam-
paign,256 and he allies himself with the political pros in Congress
against what he sees as the Court's meaningless distinctions between
constitutional limits on contributions and unconstitutional limits on
expenditures. 2 57 In his pragmatic view, Congress has identified "an
acceptable purpose and the means chosen [are] a commonsense way to
achieve it."258 Like Burger, White expresses his irritation in vivid
language, including his "regret" that the Court by its decision has con-
signed candidates to the fundraising "treadmill."2 59 Unlike Burger,
however, White sees intrusion by the Court rather than overreaching
by Congress. Their divergent views attack the per curiam from oppo-
site sides, questioning its premises more strongly than its specific
holdings. These dissonant opinions frame the per curiam like a pair of
bookends, facing in opposite directions and suggesting how capacious
the Court's opinion must be if these two Justices can both manage to
concur in part.
The two remaining separate opinions, by Justices Marshall and
Rehnquist, both focus on the same issue-a level playing field for fed-
eral elections-but with an eye to protecting predictably different con-
stituencies. For Marshall, the point of disagreement is the Court's
rejection of the statutory provision limiting the use by candidates of
their personal funds. In his view the interest at stake in regulating
expenditures of personal wealth is "the interest in promoting the real-
ity and appearance of equal access to the political arena"2 60 for rich
and poor alike. For Rehnquist it is not economic but political outsid-
ers who are being treated unfairly by the Court. He takes exception to
the Court's approval of Congress' financing scheme for presidential
elections that distinguishes the two major party candidates from mi-
nor party or independent candidates in a way that "has enshrined the
Republican and Democratic Parties in a permanently preferred posi-
tion."2 61 Like a second pair of bookends, these two concurrences
frame the per curiam with their claims of discrimination in favor of
financial and political power.
The Buckley per curiam stands alone as an extraordinary response
to an unusual situation. Its collaborative nature and its monumental
size permit the prompt coverage of numerous issues in great detail, an
256. For an account of White's role in the Kennedy campaign, see DENIs J. HUTCHIN-
SON, THE MAN WHO ONCE WAS WHIZZER WHITE 241-59 (1998).
257. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
258. Id. at 266.
259. Id. at 265. In another colorful phrase, White also rejects the view "that political
races are reserved for those who have the facility-and the stomach-for doing
whatever it takes" in order to win. Id.
260. Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
261. Id. at 293 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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admirably practical solution to the Court's predicament. But those
same virtues-the impersonal quality of the opinion and its sheer
mass-allow the whole to be swamped by its parts, the big picture to
be clouded by the many smaller images. The response of the separate
authors to the massive per curiam is to produce concurrences that fo-
cus directly on that big picture. Burger, White, Marshall, and Rehn-
quist have all distilled their reservations about the per curiam to
complementary pairs of opinions that express with great directness
their perspectives on the broad issue of government regulation of the
political process, an issue that was in danger of being overshadowed
by the sheer mass of the Court's opinion.
VI. THE PER CURIAM AND THE REHNQUIST COURT
A. The Prologue: A Limited Role
New York Times, Furman, and Buckley, the great trilogy of the
1970s, represent the high-water mark of the per curiam, its grandest
and most substantial use by the Court. Although the number of per
curiams produced by the Burger Court remained high, no subsequent
case adapted the form to such spectacular effect.26 2 Over its life the
Burger Court averaged fifteen per curiams per term, with a high of
twenty-six in 1981 and an uncharacteristic low of six in 1977.263 As
the Rehnquist Court followed the Burger Court in 1986, the number of
per curiams declined significantly. In its first term the Rehnquist
Court issued only seven per curiams, barely half of the Burger Court's
total of thirteen for the previous term, at a time when the Court's
docket had not yet begun to shrink.264 To date, the Rehnquist Court
262. According to the Harvard Law Review's annual statistics, the Burger Court pub-
lished a high of26 per curiams in the 1981 Term and a low of 6 in the 1977 Term,
averaging 15 for the period from the 1969 through the 1985 Terms, or 10 percent
of the Court's total opinion output.
263. These figures are based on the Harvard Law Review's annual statistical sum-
mary of Court opinions, which does not include all the per curiams issued each
term. According to an explanatory note,
the Review classifies some of these as full opinions depending on the
length of the opinion and the extent to which it elaborates upon the is-
sues involved. Although admittedly less precise, this method indicates
more accurately which cases received more than cursory attention by the
Court, and hence seems a more useful barometer for measuring a signifi-
cant aspect of the Court's activity.
The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. Rsv. 63, 302 (1968). Since the Court
regularly issues per curiams that fall outside these guidelines, the Harvard Law
Review statistics represent only one measure, though an important one, of the
Court's per curiam use. In the first term of the Rehnquist Court, for example, the
Court issued twelve per curiams, only seven of them included in the Harvard
Law Review tally.
264. In the 1985 Term, the Burger Court issued 159 opinions, including thirteen per
curiams; the following Term, the Rehnquist Court issued 152 opinions, including
seven per curiams. By 1995, the Court's opinion output had dropped to seventy-
2000]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
has averaged six per curiams each term, less than half of the Burger
Court's average. Even taking into account smaller opinion output, the
current Court has clearly been less inclined than its predecessor to
find in the per curiam a useful and flexible judicial instrument.
The per curiams issued by the Court in the recent presidential
election cases represent a significant departure from its earlier prac-
tice. The surprising nature of those opinions can be fully appreciated
when viewed against the backdrop of the Rehnquist Court's otherwise
restrained use of the form. The declining number of per curiams,
though revealing, tells only part of the story. The Rehnquist Court's
approach is measured as well by the situations in which it chooses to
employ the per curiam. Many of these situations are concerned with
the efficient operation of the Court rather than with substantive is-
sues. By far the largest bloc of per curiams follows in the wake of In re
Sindram,26 5 where the Court denied an indigent defendant the right
to proceed in forma pauperis because of his prior frivolous and exces-
sive filings. Justice Stevens, a dissenter though not an author in Sin-
dram, has made this issue his own, writing strong dissents to several
per curiams denying indigents the right to file and, for all subsequent
cases, noting his dissent with a brief reference to his earlier, more
elaborate opinions.26 6 Although Stevens's principal argument-that
such punitive responses are less efficient than simple denials of the
nine, a shade less than half of the Burger Court total of a decade earlier, and the
Rehnquist Court produced only four per curiams, its smallest number, in that
term. For a consideration of possible reasons for the Court's docket decline, see
Arthur D. Hellman, The Shrunken Docket of the Rehnquist Court, SuP. CT. REV.
403 (1996).
265. 498 U.S. 177 (1991).
266. When the Court amended its Rule 39 to authorize denials of motions to proceed
in forma pauperis, Stevens in dissent argued that the Court's new initiative was
misguided for administrative as well as substantive reasons:
It is usually much easier to decide that a petition should be denied than
to decide whether or not it is frivolous. Moreover, the cost of administer-
ing the amended Rule will probably exceed any tangible administrative
saving. Transcending the clerical interest that supports the Rule is the
symbolic interest in preserving equal access to the Court for both the
rich and the poor. I believe the Court makes a serious mistake when it
discounts the importance of that interest.
In re Amendment to Rule 39, 500 U.S. 13, 15 (1991)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
Blackmun joined Stevens's opinion, and Marshall filed his own dissent. See id. at
14. For an earlier per curiam dissent by Justice Brennan making similar points,
see In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 185 (1989)(Brennan, J., dissenting). Brennan
argued that "[t]o rid itself of a small portion of this annoyance, the Court now
needlessly departs from its generous tradition and improvidently sets sail on a
journey whose landing point is uncertain. We have long boasted that our door is
open to all. We can no longer." Id. at 188. In 1993, Stevens announced that "[in
the future, however, I shall not encumber the record by noting my dissent from
similar orders denying leave to proceed in forma pauperis, absent exceptional
circumstances." Day v. Day, 510 U.S. 1, 3 (1993)(Stevens, J., dissenting). For
examples of recent opinions in which Stevens offered his shorthand dissent, see
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filings involved-has not attracted any support from his current col-
leagues, the members of the Rehnquist Court in a number of other
situations routinely agree to dispose of cases with non-substantive dif-
ficulties through the per curiam. Thus, the Court has used the per
curiam to dismiss cases in which certiorari was improvidently
granted26 7 and to resolve cases for reasons that include mootness, 2 6 s
lack of ripeness,2 69 the absence of a Court quorum,27 0 and a vote re-
sulting in an evenly divided Court.271
Beyond these areas of agreement, the debate within the Court over
the propriety of summary dispositions continues even after the depar-
ture of their most vocal critic, Justice Marshall. Although many per
curiams granting certiorari and reversing the decision below without
briefing or argument are unanimous, some Justices continue to object
on occasion that the procedure, though efficient, can be inappropriate
or unfair. Where Justices Marshall and Stevens concentrated on the
element of unfairness to litigants deprived of the opportunity to pre-
sent their positions to the Court, later Justices have raised other con-
cerns. Justice Scalia, in a rare dissent from a per curiam, noted that
summary dispositions should be used only when the law is settled
and, in the case at hand, argued that its extraordinary facts war-
ranted a denial of certiorari instead.2 72 Justice Ginsburg has used her
dissent to criticize the Court for its arrogance in vacating a circuit
court stay of execution without first seeking clarification of the order.
"Appreciation of our own fallibility," she wrote for three other Jus-
tices, "and respect for the judgment of an appellate tribunal closer to
the scene than we are, as I see it, demand as much."2 73 Despite these
reservations, the Court continues to rely on per curiam summary dis-
positions as an efficient docket management device.
The use of one such summary procedure has resulted in the Rehn-
quist Court's most extensive per curiam decision. In Lawrence v.
Chater,2 74 the Court discussed at length the criteria for its use of what
it calls a GVR order, a practice by which it at once grants certiorari,
vacates the decision below, and remands to the lower court for recon-
sideration. The per curiam opinion, an unusual twelve pages in
Brancato v. Gunn, 120 S. Ct. 5, 6 (1999)(Stevens, J., dissenting); In re Vey, 520
U.S. 303, 304 (1997)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
267. See, e.g., Vermont v. Cox, 484 U.S. 173 (1987); Cerbone v. Conway, 479 U.S. 84
(1986). Both cases had been argued to the Court.
268. See, e.g., Frank v. Minnesota Newspaper Ass'n, 490 U.S. 225 (1989); Bowen v.
Kizer, 485 U.S. 386 (1988). Both cases had been argued to the Court.
269. See Anderson v. Green, 513 U.S. 557 (1995). This case was argued to the Court.
270. See Haig v. Bissonette, 485 U.S. 264 (1988).
271. See, e.g., Morgan Stanley & Co. v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 658 (1994);
Tompkins v. Texas, 490 U.S. 754 (1989). Such cases affirm the decision below.
272. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 15 (1991)(Scalia, J., dissenting).
273. Bowersox v. Williams, 517 U.S. 345, 347 (1996)(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
274. 516 U.S. 163 (1996).
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length, responded in detail to an even longer dissent by Justice Scalia
which argued for restriction of the practice to narrowly defined situa-
tions.2 75 After asserting its power to issue GVR orders, the majority
listed the advantages of the procedure, citing first among them conser-
vation of the Court's scarce resources for plenary review, 2 76 and
adopted a flexible standard based on a review of the "equities and le-
gal uncertainties" of each case.27 7 The Scalia dissent insisted that the
Court lacks the "power to make such a tutelary remand, as to a school-
boy made to do his homework again"278 and that GVR orders show a
lack of respect for lower courts. The dissent produced some character-
istically colorful Scalia rhetoric, especially the observation that the
Court's increasing use of the device "should make even the most Polly-
annish reformer believe in camel's noses, wedges, and slippery
slopes."279 In two brief opinions, Justice Stevens concurred 2 O and
Chief Justice Rehnquist, noting his substantial agreement with the
Scalia opinion, concurred in Lawrence and dissented from the GVR
order in a related case. 28 1
Lawrence is an apt illustration of the differing applications of the
per curiam by the Burger and Rehnquist Courts. The most elaborate
Burger Court per curiams are three landmark cases, each making im-
portant new law and each eliciting strong and distinctive separate
opinions from Justices with divergent views on substantive issues.
The counterpart on the Rehnquist Court is, in contrast, an opinion
dealing with the Court's internal procedures for handling the heavy
flow of certiorari petitions in an efficient and equitable manner. Law-
rence also elicits separate opinions, including a substantial response
from Scalia, and deals with an important aspect of the Court's role in
the appellate process. The remaining gap between a resonant
landmark like Buckley or Furman and a procedural discussion like
Lawrence, however, clearly reflects the current Court's return to a
sense of the per curiam as a low-profile instrument of judicial effi-
275. See id. at 177 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Scalia dissent runs for fifteen pages
and is joined by Justice Thomas. Scalia announced that he would vote for GVR
orders only in cases marked by one of three factors: an "intervening factor" with
'a legal bearing" on the case; uncertainty over the Court's jurisdiction; or confes-
sion of error in the judgment below by the winning party. Id. at 191-92.
276. See id. at 166-67. The other advantages listed by the Court were help to the court
below "by flagging a particular issue," obtaining "the benefit of the lower court's
insight before we rule on the merits," and reducing the incidence of "'unequal
treatment' that is inherent in our inability to grant plenary review of all pending
cases raising similar issues." Id. at 167.
277. Id. at 175.
278. Id. at 185-86 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
279. Id. at 190.
280. See id. at 175 (Stevens, J., concurring).
281. See id. at 176 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in Lawrence and dissenting in Stutson
v. United States, 516 U.S. 193 (1996)).
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ciency rather than a vehicle for innovative constitutional
jurisprudence.
When the Rehnquist Court does use the per curiam to resolve cases
on the merits, it tends to do so in a traditional manner. Many of these
substantive per curiams are summary dispositions which avoid full
review and simply invoke precedent, indicating that the court below
has misread or misapplied a Supreme Court precedent.28 2 Like the
earliest per curiams that contained only a cite to precedent, these
cases waste little time on an issue that the Court finds has already
been definitively resolved. On occasion, the Court will streamline the
resolution of a fully argued case by directing attention to another case
decided the same day, usually remanding for consideration in light of
the fully articulated decision.28 3 Or, as it did in a capital murder case
pending on direct review when Batson v. Kentucky2 84 established a
new standard for peremptory challenges, the Court will remand for
application of that standard.285 No new law is made by any of these
approaches, and efficiency is gained.
Unlike its predecessor, the Rehnquist Court does not use the per
curiam to announce new law. In a handful of situations, the Court has
addressed constitutional issues, but even these cases are presented as
routine applications of settled constitutional principles. When the
Court determined that an Arkansas statute providing benefit offsets
against a federal statute "authorize[d] the precise conduct that Con-
gress sought to prohibit," it found a violation of the Supremacy Clause
and, without hearing argument, granted certiorari and remanded. 286
Only Justice Marshall objected to the summary disposition.287 Even a
decision striking down a privacy provision of a Puerto Rican criminal
procedure rule as unconstitutional was handled as a summary disposi-
282. See, e.g., Bibles v. Oregon Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997)(finding the
Ninth Circuit's decision inconsistent with the Court's Freedom of Information Act
precedent); Goeke v. Branch, 514 U.S. 115 (1995)(noting that the Eighth Circuit's
"novel" rule violated the precedent established in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288
(1989)).
283. See, e.g., Hanlon v. Burger, 526 U.S. 808 (1999)(vacated and remanded); Lee v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 505 U.S. 830 (1992)(affirmed
in part); Zant v. Moore, 489 U.S. 836 (1989)(vacated and remanded).
284. 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
285. See Trevino v. Texas, 503 U.S. 562 (1992). In a single paragraph, the Court
granted the petitioner's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, granted
certiorari, and remanded "for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opin-
ion." Id. at 568.
286. Rose v. Arkansas State Police, 479 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1986). For another Supremacy
Clause case, this time one argued to the Court, see Bennett v. Arkansas, 485 U.S.
395 (1988), where the Court found an Arkansas statute authorizing attachment
of Social Security benefits to be in conflict with federal law and reversed the Ar-
kansas Supreme Court. See id. at 398.
287. See Rose, 479 U.S. at 5.
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tion, this time without objection from any Justice.288 Only very rarely
has any member of the Court complained that a case provided a cur-
sory treatment of an important issue. When the Court ruled that the
Eighth Circuit had erred in evaluating a Batson claim, Justice Ste-
vens thought it "unwise... to announce a law-changing decision with-
out first ordering full briefing and argument on the merits of the
case,"28 9 but only Justice Breyer joined in the protest.2 90 Breyer him-
self has protested summary disposition of an unusual criminal case
where the defendant's counsel, who was not a member of the Supreme
Court bar, failed to file a brief in opposition to the state's certiorari
petition.2 91 Justice Kennedy, who very seldom adds a separate opin-
ion to a per curiam, was moved to dissent from another summary dis-
position holding that Secret Service agents guarding the president
were entitled to qualified immunity from a suit brought by a sus-
pect.2 9 2 In a variation of the arguments usually advanced by Stevens,
Kennedy insisted that the importance of the issue warranted full
briefing and argument.2 93
These cases illustrate another aspect of the Rehnquist Court's use
of the per curiam - the general absence of strongly worded separate
opinions taking exception to the Court's handling of its cases. On a
Court whose members have not been shy about asserting their indi-
vidual views with vigor and occasionally with venom, this absence
suggests a broad-based consensus on a limited role for the per curiam.
Even when a per curiam is accompanied by multiple concurrences and
dissents, those opinions tend to be brief and muted in their rheto-
ric.294 Perhaps most significantly, Justice Scalia, usually the most
strident author of separate opinions, has been remarkably restrained
in his per curiam efforts. In one concurrence he noted, almost apolo-
288. See El Vocero de Puerto Rico v. Puerto Rico, 508 U.S. 147 (1997).
289. Purkett v. Elm, 514 U.S. 765, 770 (1995)(Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also
accused the Court of"resolv[ing] a novel procedural question without even recog-
nizing its importance to the unusual facts of this case." Id. at 771.
290. See id.
291. Breyer, joined by Stevens, dissented from the summary disposition, asserting
that "we should not summarily reverse in a criminal case, irrespective of the mer-
its, where the respondent is represented by a counsel unable to file a response,
without first inviting an attorney to file a brief as amicus curiae in response to
the petition for certiorari." Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465, 468 (1999)(Breyer,
J, dissenting).
292. See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 234-35 (1991)(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
293. See id. Kennedy also relied on the fact that two other Justices, Scalia and Ste-
vens, "disagree[d] with the statement in the per curiam opinion that the Court of
Appeals misstated the law" as a second basis for full review. Id. at 235.
294. See, e.g., United States v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148 (1997), with concurring opinions by
Scalia and Breyer, id. at 158, and dissenting opinions by Stevens and Kennedy,
id. at 159. See also City of Monroe v. United States, 522 U.S. 34 (1997). Scalia
concurred in the judgment, id. at 39; Souter, joined by Breyer, dissented, id. at
40; Breyer, joined by Souter, dissented, id. at 45.
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getically, "I write as I have written only because the Court has re-
jected the traditional view of habeas corpus relief as discretionary."2 9 5
In a more characteristic rhetorical performance, Scalia in another con-
currence found that the Court's position "soars beyond the unimagin-
able, into the wildly delirious."29 6 That language stands out as an
isolated instance, an exception to the general rule of low key responses
to the Court's per curiams.
The tone for the Rehnquist Court's use of the per curiam has in
part been set by its Chief, who has seldom contributed separate opin-
ions.2 97 On the few occasions when he has been tempted to write for
himself, Rehnquist tends to focus on institutional issues rather than
the substantive dissatisfactions of a single Justice. Early in his ten-
ure as Chief Justice, he observed in dissent that a decision vacating
the circuit court's unpublished per curiam order "without any sugges-
tion of error or intervening change in the law is an unwise use" of the
resources of both courts.298 In another dissent, he noted that he was
not in favor of automatic vacation "when the [Solicitor General] con-
fesses error,"2 99 a practice by which the federal government relin-
quishes a victory which it believes is unearned.30 0 More recently,
Rehnquist dissented from a per curiam in which he found the Court's
remand "muddled and cryptic" and insisted that the lower court was
entitled to "clearer guidance." 30 1 These occasional dissents respond-
ing to the Court's institutional practices rather than its substantive
law suggest Rehnquist's preference for assigning the per curiam a lim-
ited role that advances the efficiency of the Court's decisionmaking
process but does not engage unresolved or controversial issues.
295. California v. Roy, 519 U.S. 2, 8 (1996)(Scalia, J., concurring).
296. Dobbs v. Zant, 506 U.S. 357, 363 (1993)(Scalia, J., concurring). He also referred
to "this Court's 'death is different' time warp." Id.
297. Rehnquist has made clear his concern with the efficient operation of the Court.
In writing about his conduct of the conference, he has aligned himself with the
Hughes rather than the Stone model. See REHNQUIST, supra note 73, at 293. In
Rehnquist's view, "the true purpose of the conference discussion of argued cases
is not to persuade one's colleagues through impassioned advocacy to alter their
views, but instead by hearing each justice express his own views to determine
therefrom the view of the majority of the Court." Id. at 295.
298. Terrell v. Morris, 493 U.S. 1, 4 (1989)(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist
was joined by Justices White, O'Connor, and Scalia. See id. at 3.
299. Alvarado v. U.S., 497 U.S. 543, 545 (1990)(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehn-
quist was joined by Justices O'Connor, Scala, and Kennedy. See id.
300. See LINcoLN CAPLAN, THE TENTH JusTIcE 9 (1988). According to Caplan, Rehn-
quist, who has long disliked the practice, "browbeat[s] the SG when he steps up to
confess" and believes that the Justices should not accept these confessions of er-
ror "but should instead make their own rulings on the case." Id. at 10.
301. Lords Landing Village Condominium Council of Unit Owners v. Continental Ins.
Co., 520 U.S. 893, 898 (1997)(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Rehnquist was joined
by Justice Breyer. See id. at 897.
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Against this backdrop of limited use, the Rehnquist Court's deci-
sion to issue its opinions in both Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvass-
ing Board and Bush v. Gore in per curiam form reflects the
extraordinary demands placed on the Court by those cases. Just as
the Burger Court on three occasions of constitutional challenge found
the per curiam adaptable to its needs, so the Rehnquist Court, faced
with its own unprecedented constitutional challenge, turned to the per
curiam to deliver its momentous response.
B. Bush v. Gore: The Return to Center Stage
When the Rehnquist Court granted certiorari to review the Florida
Supreme Court's first presidential election decision, it faced a chal-
lenging judicial prospect. As Bush v. Gore later confirmed, the Court
was strongly divided on the issue of the Florida Supreme Court's aii-
thority to extend the state's certification deadline and include re-
counted votes in the final tally. The Court was also painfully aware
that Bush supporters had vigorously denounced the Florida court's
opinion as a partisan effort to salvage the Gore candidacy by a bench
composed almost entirely of Democratic appointees. At the threshold,
then, the Supreme Court faced institutional concerns prompted by its
own internal divisions and by the specter of harsh criticism if its opin-
ion appeared to reflect the political preferences of its Justices. The
Court had before it the model of United States v. Nixon, where a unan-
imous opinion, forged with great difficulty and authored by the Chief
Justice, a Nixon appointee, had avoided such partisan implications in
another high-profile controversy surrounding the presidency and had
won the Court high praise for judicial statesmanship. A unanimous
opinion in Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board would
clearly be of great value in shielding the Court from accusations of
partisanship and confirming its position as a neutral decisionmaker.
The Court also had less personal reasons to seek unanimity. The
Court's opinion would inevitably send two distinct messages, one to
the nation and one to the Florida court. In speaking to the nation, the
Court's challenge was to defuse if possible the tension surrounding the
disputed election by issuing an opinion that would neither inflame the
losing side nor foster bitterness in the nation at large over federal ju-
dicial intervention. In speaking to the Florida court, the Supreme
Court addressed at once a lower court subject to its review on issues
on federal law and a state court entitled to its respect under principles
of federalism. Both messages could most effectively be sent by a uni-
fied Court that concealed any internal differences and spoke in a sin-
gle voice.
The further and subtler question, however, was whose voice it
would be. The opinion could have been signed by Chief Justice Rehn-
quist in the Court's tradition of allowing the Chief Justice to author its
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most significant cases, as Earl Warren did in Brown. The Court could
also have opted to issue an opinion signed by all nine Justices, as it
did in Cooper v. Aaron and as Justice Brennan had proposed it do in
United States v. Nixon. There would have been, however, drawbacks
to both options. An opinion signed by the Chief Justice would inevita-
bly be personalized, carrying the imprint of an author whose political
background had necessitated his own recusal in the Nixon case. The
adoption of the Cooper v. Aaron approach, an extraordinary device
used by the Court to assert the force of its constitutional powers to
enforce desegregation under Brown, could sharpen concerns about the
extent of its role in resolving an election controversy.
Under these circumstances, the per curiam was a much more ap-
propriate choice. The unsigned opinion was effectively depersonal-
ized, coming not from individual Justices with political baggage but
from the Court itself, an institution situating itself above politics. The
Court also benefited from the per curiam's traditional reputation as
an instrument of consensus. Its label suggested that the Justices had
achieved significant agreement and were equally committed to the re-
sult they had collectively reached. Finally, and most importantly, the
per curiam form reflected the modesty and neutrality of the opinion's
substance.
The Court's brief per curiam opinion spent more than half of its
four pages setting forth the history of the case.302 The remaining
pages contained four block quotations totaling almost fifty lines, leav-
ing the Court barely a page for its own language. The Court quoted
Article II of the Constitution,S03 the federal statute creating the safe
harbor deadline of December 12th,304 and two Supreme Court prece-
dents: McPherson v. Blacker,305 cited for the plenary power of the
state legislature,306 and Minnesota v. National Tea Co.,307 cited for
the Supreme Court's authority to ask for clarification of ambiguous
state court rulings which might impede constitutional review of state
action.30 The cumulative mass of these quotations suggested indi-
rectly that the Court was relying heavily on external authority and
that its decision was constrained by that authority rather than gener-
ated by the will of its Justices. The penultimate sentences of the opin-
ion were even more modest in their presentation: "Specifically, we are
unclear as to the extent to which the Florida Supreme Court saw the
Florida Constitution as circumscribing the legislature's authority
302. Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 121 S. Ct. 471, 472-73 (2000).
303. See id. at 474.
304. See id.
305. 146 U.S. 1 (1892).
306. See id.
307. 309 U.S. 551 (1940).
308. See Bush, 121 S. Ct. at 475.
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under Art. II, §1, cl.2. We are also unclear as to the consideration the
Florida Supreme Court accorded to 3 U.S.C. § 5."309 The Court speaks
in the first person plural to acknowledge its shared need for clarifica-
tion. The syntax is simple and direct, with the second sentence a pre-
cise echo of the first. Finally, the message itself is non-accusatory and
bland, without any hint that the Florida court has engaged in any ju-
dicial overreaching. The conclusion, vacating the Florida decision and
remanding for "further proceedings not inconsistent with this opin-
ion," is presented in context as the only rational response to the
Court's genuine uncertainty over the intentions of the Florida
CoUrt.3 1 0
In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the Court found
in the per curiam the appropriate instrument to convey its calming
message. All nine Justices, the Court told the nation, are united in
our effort to resolve this matter in a reasoned and principled manner,
subject to law and precedent. We recognize that important federal is-
sues may be implicated by the Florida opinion, and, as prudent deci-
sionmakers, we must be certain that we understand precisely what
the Florida court intended before we venture further. The per curiam
allowed the Court to assert in the same opinion its constitutional au-
thority and its deference to principles of federalism. The opinion itself
resolved nothing, but it managed to claim for the Court a respectable
place outside the political thicket.
The Court faced a much greater challenge when it agreed to review
the Florida Supreme Court's second decision ordering an immediate
statewide recount.31 The Court not only granted the Bush cam-
paign's application for stay but also treated the application as a peti-
tion for certiorari, and the Court's preliminary order, issued on
December 9th, eliminated at a stroke any claim to the unanimity as-
serted by the earlier per curiam. Justice Stevens's dissent to the
granting of the stay accused the majority of violating established prin-
ciples of judicial restraint and predicted that the stay would "inevita-
bly cast a cloud on the legitimacy of the election."3 i 2 More
dramatically, it was joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
and countered by a concurrence from Justice Scalia, who noted, "a ma-
jority of the Court, while not deciding the issues presented, believe
that the petitioner has a substantial probability of success."31 3 Even
before the Court began drafting its final opinion in Bush v. Gore, it
had informed an expectant nation that its members were already at
least preliminarily aligned five to four in support of the Bush position.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 512 (2000).
312. Id. at 513 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
313. Id. at 512 (Scalia, J., concurring).
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The posture of modest reserve fostered by the earlier per curiam was
effectively replaced by an adversarial alignment of Justices.
In light of this publicly proclaimed division, it is all the more re-
markable that, when the final opinion did emerge on December 12th,
it was once again in the form of a per curiam. The Court's unsigned
opinion was accompanied by five signed opinions: a concurrence by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas;3 i 4 a
dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer;31 5
a dissent by Justice Souter, joined by Justice Breyer and, in part, by
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg;316 a dissent by Justice Ginsburg,
joined by Justice Stevens and, in part, by Justices Souter and
Breyer;3 i 7 and a dissent by Justice Breyer, joined in part by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Souter. 31 8 This bare lineup of Justices an-
nounced clearly the extent of the Court's internal disagreement, not
only between majority and dissent but within each bloc as well. Only
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy did not sign their names to any part
of any separate opinion, suggesting that their views were expressed by
the per curiam alone.
Why, then, did the Court issue a per curiam instead of a majority
opinion signed by the Chief Justice or by one of the Justices who fully
supported its content? The opinion itself and the circumstances of its
issuance provide some clues. First, of course, is the question of timing.
The Court relied in part on what it viewed as the Florida Supreme
Court's recognition of the state legislature's intention to meet the De-
cember 12th safe harbor deadline, finding it "obvious" that no consti-
tutionally acceptable recount could be completed before that date.319
It would have been potentially embarrassing for the Court, under
those circumstances, to fail itself to release its opinion before that
deadline passed. The opinion barely beat the deadline, appearing just
two hours before midnight, but it did carry the date of December 12th.
It is possible that the limited time available between oral argument at
11:00 a.m. on December 11th and the end of the safe harbor deadline
at midnight on December 12th necessitated an opinion that was, like
Buckley v. Valeo, written in different chambers and cobbled together.
Even if Bush v. Gore was not an opinion by committee, the per curiam
has other efficiency advantages. It permits members of a Court major-
ity to reach a rough agreement on basic positions, expressed in the per
curiam, and then write separate opinions detailing their more refined
views. The per curiam also spares any Justice from signing an opinion
314. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525, 533 (2000)(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
315. See id. at 539 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
316. See id. at 542 (Souter, J., dissenting).
317. See id. at 546 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
318. See id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
319. See id. at 532.
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that may, because of severe time constraints, be less coherent, less
elegant, or less responsive to the dissents than its author might wish.
It is notable that in Bush v. Gore, Chief Justice Rehnquist, a member
of the majority who possessed the assignment power, chose instead to
author a concurrence adding what he termed "additional grounds" for
reversal of the Florida decision.320 When an opinion is, like this one,
destined to be read and studied widely for many years to come, pride
of authorship may work in reverse to counsel the anonymity of the per
curiam.
Beyond such circumstantial factors, however, the content of the
opinion also suggests that the Court hoped to benefit from the aura of
consensus that the per curiam label carries. By its diction, the per
curiam claimed that its position was irrefutable. Not only was it "ob-
vious" that no constitutional recount could be completed in time-it
was also "evident" that any recount meeting the deadline would be
unconstitutional. 32 ' More strikingly, the per curiam claimed the sup-
port of Justices who had not joined it. The opinion noted that "[sieven
Justices of the Court agree that there are constitutional problems
with the recount ordered by the Florida Supreme Court that demand a
remedy" and that "[t]he only disagreement is as to the remedy."322
The use of "only" to minimize the significance of that disagreement is
somewhat disingenuous, since in this case the recount remedy was the
crucial element before the Court.
The per curiam's claim to broad support within the Court is refuted
by the strong positions and language of the separate opinions. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's concurrence found "that the Florida Supreme
Court's interpretation of the Florida election laws impermissibly dis-
torted them beyond what a fair reading required, in violation of Arti-
cle II."323 Going beyond the equal protection argument of the per
curiam, Rehnquist criticized the Florida court for basing its analysis
on an "entirely irrelevant"324 statutory provision and for crafting a
remedy that ignored legislative intentions.325 Thus, three of the five
members of the Court's majority made clear their view that the per
curiam opinion was too limited in its scope.
The two dissenting Justices who allegedly supported the per
curiam made their divergence even clearer. Although Justice Souter
agreed that disparate ballot counting standards created an equal pro-
tection problem, he rejected the December 12th deadline in favor of
December 18th and found "no justification for denying the State the
320. See id. at 533 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 535 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
324. Id. at 538.
325. See id.
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opportunity to try to count all disputed ballots now."3 26 Justice
Breyer, who also found an equal protection problem, was even more
vehement in rejecting the majority's position. He opened his opinion
by calling the Court "wrong" to have granted certiorari initially and to
have issued a stay32 7 and saw "no justification for the majority's rem-
edy."3 2 8 Arguing that presidential elections are political matters that
require judicial restraint, Breyer found the Court's willingness to in-
volve itself in the matter an improvident and dangerous step. He
noted, "[tlhe appearance of a split decision runs the risk of undermin-
ing the public's confidence in the Court itself," a confidence which he
termed "a public treasure."3 29 Even more fundamentally, "we do risk
a self-inflicted wound-a wound that may harm not just the Court,
but the Nation."33 0 The Souter and Breyer dissents reveal how far
apart their authors were from the sense of the per curiam and how
thin the claim to their support for its central position really was.
The other two dissenting opinions provide additional evidence of
the fundamental division within the Court. Justice Stevens's dissent
rejected both the equal protection claim and, more importantly, what
it termed the "unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and ca-
pacity of the state judges" who would implement the recount.33 1 Ste-
vens's opinion concluded with a harsh assessment of the institutional
consequences of the Court's position, noting that "the identity of the
loser" of the election is "perfectly clear": "It is the Nation's confidence
in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law."33 2 In her
dissent Justice Ginsburg criticized the Court for failing to defer to the
Florida Supreme Court's construction of state law, what she termed
an "ordinary principle" reflecting "the core of federalism."333 She too
ended her opinion with a harsh rejection of the Court's holding that no
constitutionally acceptable recount was possible as "an untested
prophecy [that] should not decide the Presidency of the United
States."3 34 She omitted the usual adverb "respectfully," used by her
three colleagues, and ended with a terse "I dissent."33 5 Read together,
the dissents and the concurrence seriously weaken any claim to con-
sensus founded on the majority's use of the per curiam.
The Court is also at some pains to limit the reach of its holding,
and for that purpose the per curiam label, suggesting that no signifi-
326. Id. at 546 (Souter, J., dissenting).
327. See id. at 550 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
328. Id. at 551.
329. Id. at 557.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 542 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
332. Id.
333. Id. at 549 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).




cant new law has been made, is more helpful. The opinion identified a
voter's fundamental equal protection right to have each vote counted
in a manner that "avoid[s] arbitrary and disparate treatment."3 36
This is a new equal protection principle, one with potentially far-
reaching implications, and the opinion seems anxious to rein in the
principle it has just formulated. After locating the new right "in the
special instance of a statewide recount under the authority of a single
judicial officer,"3 3 7 the opinion expressly disclaimed any intent to craft
a generally applicable principle: "Our consideration is limited to the
present circumstances, for the problem of equal protection in election
processes generally presents many complexities." 3 38 The new right,
then, is carefully circumscribed, and its announcement in a per
curiam opinion attempts to reinforce the Court's position that the
right, though sufficiently fundamental to halt the recount, is not suffi-
ciently comprehensive to deserve the status of a signed opinion.
In the most striking paragraph of the opinion, the Court asserted a
limitation of a different sort, a limitation on its own judicial role:
None are more conscious of the vital limits on judicial authority than are the
members of this Court, and none stand more in admiration of the Constitu-
tion's design to leave the selection of the President to the people, through their
legislatures, and to the political sphere. When contending parties invoke the
process of the courts, however, it becomes our unsought responsibility to re-
solve the federal and constitutional issues the judicial system has been forced
to confront.3 3 9
This curious passage, like the equal protection right created and then
confined, seems both to assert and reject judicial power. The first sen-
tence embraces judicial restraint and disavows a judicial role in select-
ing the president. The second sentence then rejects that restraint
because the Court, against its will, has been dragged into the case by
the litigants. The Court is presented as a passive entity, accepting the
"unsought responsibility" that "the judicial system has been forced to
confront," with no mention of the Court's affirmative role in staying
the recount and granting certiorari or of the position taken by one
party-the Gore campaign-against Court intervention. The invoca-
tion of "contending parties" carries a faint echo of Planned Parenthood
v. Casey,3 40 where the jointly authored opinion by Justices O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter noted the Court's special commitment to stare
decisis when "the contending sides of a national controversy... end
their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the
Constitution."3 41 In that opinion the authors described a judicial obli-
336. Id. at 530.
337. Id. at 532.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 533.
340. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
341. Id. at 867.
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gation that could conflict with and override the individual preferences
of the Justices. Here too the Court's opinion claims that the Justices
of the majority are reluctant decisionmakers, forced to resolve this
case but unwilling to extend their unsought authority beyond the min-
imum required to perform that task.
The per curiam form thus promises to meet several of the Court's
needs in this extraordinary case. By suggesting that the opinion
comes from the Court rather than from an identified Justice, the per
curiam assumes institutional authority and attempts, with limited
success, to underplay the serious division reflected by the vote and the
separate opinions. The per curiam also suggests an opinion of modest
intentions, useful to a Court that insists at the same time on identify-
ing a new constitutional right and limiting its application. Most dra-
matically, the per curiam seems intended to support the Court's
assertion that, far from engaging in judicial activism in resolving the
presidential election, it is in fact only reluctantly entering the fray to
fulfill its constitutional role.
For the past sixty years the Court has found the per curiam a flexi-
ble instrument readily adaptable to new situations, but the demands
of Bush v. Gore prove too great. Although the Court attempted to link
together its two opinions by referring to Bush v. Palm Beach County
Canvassing Board as Bush 1,342 the differences between the per
curiam remanding for clarification and the per curiam resolving a
presidential election remain sharp and strong. In the earlier case the
Court used the per curiam effectively to respond to a heated contro-
versy with a modest and tentative opinion, what Cass Sunstein has
characterized as "a triumph for good sense and even for the rule of
law."3 43 In Bush v. Gore, however, the Court was both more aggres-
sive and less successful. Its use of the per curiam form failed to pack-
age the majority opinion as a restrained solution, based on a
substantial consensus, to a national problem that the Supreme Court
was reluctantly compelled to solve.
VII. CONCLUSION
In almost a century and a half of Supreme Court appearances, the
per curiam opinion has played a great variety of roles. In its earliest
form, the per curiam label signaled an opinion with no substance used
to dispose of a routine case in the most efficient manner. Starting
with the Roosevelt Court, the per curiam gradually evolved into a flex-
ible judicial instrument capable of serving a range of strategic pur-
poses. The Burger Court found in the per curiam a method of
342. See Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. at 527.




resolving difficult cases under challenging circumstances, bringing it
remarkable prominence. The fortunes of the per curiam waned in the
Rehnquist Court, which seemed interested in using it principally for
the swift resolution of cases which required little if any analysis and
inspired little debate among the Justices. With Bush v. Palm Beach
County Canvassing Board and Bush v. Gore, however, the per curiam
made an unexpected return to center stage as the vehicle for resolu-
tion of a momentous episode in American legal history.
This surprising resurgence of the per curiam does not, however,
mean that the Rehnquist Court is likely to employ it for cases of major
import in the future. The per curiam has functioned most effectively
when it allowed the Court to strike a balance between the institu-
tional need for consensus and the individual need for personal expres-
sion. In the decades since the members of the Roosevelt Court
discarded the norm of broadly consensual decisionmaking in favor of a
more individualized process, freeing each Justice to speak directly and
even idiosyncratically, the Court, despite some criticism, has rarely
looked back. Faced with cases like Brown and United States v. Nixon,
the Court has mustered the unanimity necessary to meet the occasion.
In Bush v. Gore, with the Court unable to do so, it settled instead on
the per curiam as an alternate method of conveying the institutional
unity that the Court clearly lacked. The effort failed precisely because
the Rehnquist Court itself has become identified with a jurisprudence
of individual expression in which agreement is no longer highly val-
ued. Accustomed to reading the separate opinions of Justices in
strong conflict, students of the Court were not likely to be lulled by the
per curiam label into the belief that this opinion represented an au-
thentic consensus.
In the current jurisprudential universe of five to four divisions and
multiple separate opinions, the Justices are unconstrained in expres-
sing their views and have little use for a form of opinion that com-
municates consensus. The per curiam opinion written "by the Court"
has a vaguely old-fashioned sound, an echo of an era when the institu-
tion subsumed the Justices who served it. The current Court acts as
nine individual Justices, and today an authentic opinion by the Court
is one that speaks not in a single anonymous voice but in a dissonant
chorus.
[Vol. 79:517
